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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Compensation of Officers-Attacks by
Minority Stockholders
In a recent case1 decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff, owner of non-voting, cumulative preferred
stock brought a derivative action attacking the compensation paid by the
corporation to its officers. The plaintiff alleged suppression of divi-
dends, excessive salaries and bonuses, and fraudulent conversion of cor-
'Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
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porate assets by the directors who were also the officers of the
corporation and owned all its common stock. The judgment of the
lower court holding the compensation reasonable and denying the plain-
tiff's prayer for an accounting was affirmed, except as to bonuses
awarded retroactively. As to these, a retrial was ordered.
Attacks by minority stockholders against the compensation 2 paid cor-
porate executives reached a peak following the "booming twenties."
With corporate profits currently reaching an all-time high, and with
this tendency correspondingly characteristic of executive compensation,
such- attacks may again become prominent. An inquiry into the situa-
tions in which courts of equity will review3 remuneration received by
corporate officers at the instance of minority stockholders would seem
appropriate. Generally, these may be divided into three categories:
(1) where excessiveness or unreasonableness of compensation alone is
the primary complaint; (2) where excessiveness is coupled with bad
faith; (3) where payment of the compensation is not authorized by
charter, by-law, statute or agreement.
The proposition governing the fixing of executive compensation may
be generally stated: compensation must be reasonably related to the
value of the services rendered.4
The same general principles are applicable to both salaries and bonuses and
"compensation" as used herein denotes both. "Salary" refers to fixed or flat-rate
compensation; bonus embraces incentive compensation derived from some type of
profit-sharing plan. The more usual incentive compensation plans provide pay-
ment in stock options, stock, pensions, annuities or cash.
The liability of independent corporation directors, as such, for payment of ex-
cessive salaries to officers is beyond the scope of this discussion. For a discussion
of the protection afforded directors by the "business judgment" rule see Carson,
Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MicH. L. REv. 1125
(1942).
'Relief may take the form of an accounting, injunction, receivership or in ex-
treme cases dissolution.
' Rogers v. Hill, 298 U. S. 582 (1933), reversing 60 F. 2d 109 (C. C. A. 2d
1932); 28 ILL. L. REV. 712 (1934); 17 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1933); 42 YALE L. J.
419 (1933); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E. D.
Pa. 1943), modified 53 F. Supp. 488, Comment 32 CALIF. L. REv. 88 (1944);
Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Wight v. Heublein, 238
Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq.
197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903) ; Baker v. Cohn, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1942), modified 40
N. Y. S. 2d 623, 292 N. Y. 570 (1944) ; Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 153
App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914) (com-
pensation may not be a mere incident of the office) ; Carr v. Kimball, 153 App.
Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912); Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 150
N. E. 832 (1926) (where several positions are held, although aggregate compen-
sation may not be excessive, compensation for each office must also be reasonable) ;
Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922);
7 'MI NN. L. REv. 347 (1923) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W.
593 (1925) ; Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926)
(value of services cannot be predicated on holding of stock in corporation) ; Hurt
v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) (fact profit
would be taken for taxes if not paid in compensation is no justification). See
Notes, 27 A. L. R. 305 (1923) ; 44 A. L. R. 570 (1926). See Baker, A Just Gauge
for Executive Compensation, 22 HARv. Bus. REv. 75 (1943).
Myers v. Ft. Hill Engraving Co., 249 Mass. 302, 143 N. E. 915 (1924).
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The question of the reasonableness of compensation is one of fact5
and the circumstances of each case must necessarily govern. While no
one factor is determinative, courts have laid particular stress upon one
or more in reaching a decision. Thus the time and effort devoted by
the officer to the corporation affairs has an important bearing ;" likewise,
the character and extent of services rendered is pertinent.7  The com-
pensation previously paid,8 and the compensation of executives in sim-
ilar positions in competing corporations 9 have also been considered. The
personal attributes and ability of the particular executive involved re-
ceive particular attention.10 Factors germane to the status of the cor-
poration itself may also be applicable. The relation of compensation to
the profits made and dividends paid" and the relative bearing of the
efforts of the executive to the success of the corporation' 2 merit consid-
eration. What effect does ratification of the compensation by the stock-
holders have upon the court's consideration of the subject? Under the
doctrine of Rogers v. Hill,'3 where the court said that unreasonable
compensation was waste and the majority had no power to make a gift
of corporate property or authorize waste over the protests of a minority,
it apparently has no effect as to the right of the minority to a review by
equity. But in later litigation 14 involving some of the same executives,
* Blancard v. Blancard & Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 264, 125 Atl. 337 (1924) ; Atwater v.
Elkhorn Valley Coal-Land Co., 184 App. Div. 253, 171 N. Y. Supp. 552 (1918),
aff'd, 227 N. Y. 611, 125 N. E. 912 (1919); Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153
S. E. 240 (1930).
'Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95 (1908) (president
had sole charge of all business and financial policies); Koplar v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937) (personal services and financial
assistance rendered corporation); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.
2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) (officers personally endorsed corporation obligations).
'Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co:, 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903);
Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905).
'Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1942);
Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937). But what
officer might make in a different business could not be considered. Lillard v.
Oil, Paint & Drug Co., supra note 8.
" McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 112 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 4th 1940),
certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 729 (1940); Diamond v. Davis, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 181
(1945); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (19.41), aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d131/.(1941).
,W Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Wight v. Heublein,
238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Raynolds v. Diamond Mill Paper Co., 69
N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905).
" Pouch v. Nat'l Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Ky. 243, 143 S. W. 1003 (1912);
Luyckx v. Aylward Coal Co., 270 Mich. 468, 259 N. W. 135 (1935); Heller v.
Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (1941), aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (1941). But
see Raynolds v. Diamond Mill Paper Co., supra note 11, where court said success
of corporation was measured by what the stockholders received and mere accu-
mulation of assets by the directors would not justify large compensation.
It should be noted that success may be a false standard when corporation is
struggling and in bad condition since it is here that greatest effort and most val-
uable services may be rendered by the officers and directors.
12298 U. S. 582 (1933).
' Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (1941), aft'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131
(1941) ; accord, Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1937) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925).
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the New York court said ratification by disinterested majority after full
disclosure 5 could be considered significant as bearing on the "equities"
of the case. It would seem, then, that ratification of the majority, per
se, should have no bearing on the right of the minority to "their day
in court"; but it may have considerable weight in determining the ques-
tion of reasonableness.
It is often said that the court will not act as the general manager
of the corporation or assume regulation of its business; and if the
directors, without adverse interest to the stockholders, act in good faith
in fixing compensation of the officers their judgment will not be dis-
turbed."6 While the amount of the compensation may be so large as to
justify an inquiry by equity to determine if misuse or waste is present,
the burden of proving that it is clearly oppressive or wasteful remains
upon the attacking minority1 7 The courts feel the lack of any clear
standard of reasonableness by which to judge the questioned remunera-
tion, and the result is that a clear showing of oppression or waste is
required before the courts will substitute their judgment for that of the
directors. The distinction between waste and mere excessiveness is
aptly put by District Judge Coleman in the McQuillen case:
"We must distinguish between compensation that is actually
wasteful and that which is merely excessive. The former is un-
lawful, the latter is not. The former is the result of a failure
"Full and complete disclosure of all aspects of the compensation plan is neces-
sary if ratification by the disinterested majority is to be afforded any weight in
determination of reasonableness. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp.
960 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148,
154 Atl. 321 (1931). For a discussion of the extent to which disclosure is com-
pelled by regulations of the S. E. C. and other governmental agencies, see Gco. T.
Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REv. 733,
764 (1941).
" "In determining whether salaries are excessive and unreasonable so that there
should be a restoration courts proceed with some caution. An intolerable con-
dition might result if the courts should too lightly undertake the fixing of salaries
at the suit of dissatisfied stockholders. An issue as to the reasonable value of the
services of officers is easily made. It is not intended that courts shall be called
upon to make a yearly audit and adjust salaries. The dissenting stockholder
should come into court with proof of wrongdoing or oppression and should have
more than a claim based on mere differences of opinion upon the question whether
equal services could have been procured for somewhat less." Seitz v. Union Brass
& Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 464, 189 N. W. 586, 587 (1922); Poutch v.
Nat'l Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Ky. 242, 143 S. W. 1003 (1912) (must be fraud
before court will interfere) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W.
593 (1925); Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N. E. 2d 396 (C. P. Ohio
1946) ; cf. Bates St. Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 Atl. 293 (1931).
1? Rogers v. Hill, 298 U. S. 582 (1933) (salary and bonuses of president of
American Tobacco Co. amounted to $842,507.72 in one year) ; Heller v. Boylan,
29 N. Y. S. 2d 653, aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (1941) (salary and bonus of
same official as in Rogers case had been reduced to approximately $400,000 a
year) ; Gallin v. Nat'l City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1934) (salary
and bonuses of president amounted to $1,417,149.72 for one year. Court said no




to relate the amount of compensation to the needs of the par-
ticular situation by any recognized business practices, honestly,
even though unwisely adopted; namely, the result of bad faith,
or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices. Excessive
compensation results from poor judgment, not necessarily from
anything else."18
The result of this attitude by the courts is an overwhelming majority
of cases upholding the compensation and mffirming the judgment of
independent directors. 19
Where fraud or bad faith is evidenced, the reluctance of courts of
equity to interfere in the internal affairs of corporations is overcome.20
Thus, where a fraudulent scheme to absorb the profits of the corpora-
tions appears or where there is willful oppression of the rights of the
minority, as for example, an attempt to "freeze out" a minority holder,
appropriate relief is afforded.2 1 Where directors are also officers and
participated in fixing their own compensation; i.e., where there is "self-
dealing," most courts feel this alone is enough to justify a review by
equity of the reasonableness of the questioned compensation.22  Because
18McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (1939), aff'd,
112 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 4th 1940), certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 729 (1940).
" See Geo. T. Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54
H.-v. L. REv. 733 (1941).
"
0Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E. D. Ky. 1939),
aff'd, 127 F. 2d 291 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 639 (1942); Balch v. In-
vestor's Royalty Co., 7 F. Supp. 420 (N. D. Okla. 1934); Church v. Harnet, 35
F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 732 (1929); Wight v.
Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky. 838, 171
S. W. 393 (1914) ; Mathews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645
(1917) ; Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903);
Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 118 Ati. 257 (1922), aff'd, 123 Atl. 925 (1924);
Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912); Neff v. 20th
Century Silk Corp., 312 Pa. 386, 167 AtI. 578 (1933). But cf. Luyckx v. R. L.
Aylward Coal Co., 270 Mich. 468, 259 N. W. 135 (1935).
2 Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924) (where directors
sought to absorb all profits); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516
(1927) (where excessive compensation 'was part of scheme for fraudulent sup-
pression of dividends); Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 57 Misc. 383, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 760 (1908) (where board sought to absorb profits through compensation,
plaintiff having refused to sell his stock) ; Carr v. Kimball, supra note 20 (where
officers gained working control and sought to exclude plaintiff from all profits and
knowledge of corporate affairs); Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R. I. 146, 31 Atl. 1058
(1895) (where salaries were fixed to deprive plaintiffs of dividends on their mort-
gaged stock in event they obtained right to redeem); Newcomer v. Mountain
States Ice & Cold Storage Co., 63 S. D. 81, 256 N. W. 359 (1934) (where de-
fendant directors, engaged in competing business, had bought into control of defend-
ant corporation and compensation part of plan to ruin business).2 Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Booth v. Beattie, 95
N. J. Eq. 776, 118 AtI. 257 (1922), aff'd, 123 AtI. 925 (1924); Lillard v. Oil,
Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 AtI. 254 (1903); Davis v. Thomas A.
Davis Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 572, 52 Att. 717 (1902) ; Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co.,
108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95 (1908) ; Sagalyn v. Meekins, 290 Mass. 434, 195 N. E.
769 (1935); Carr v. Kimble, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912);
Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153 S. E. 240 (1930); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky.
838, 171 S. W. 393 (1914). But cf. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 392,
156 At. 293 (1931).
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of the fiduciary relationship existing between the directors or officers
and the stockholders, some courts take the position that self-dealing
imposes the burden of establishing the fairness and reasonableness of
the compensation upon the interested director, or that bad faith is
presumed.23
May such transactions of interested directors be ratified by the stock-
holders; and if so, what is the effect? Where the interested director
voted for the compensation-fixing resolution, or his presence was neces-
sary to a quorum, the minority view holds such resolutions or contracts
to be void ;24 and it follows that there can be no ratification. The pre-
vailing view, however, is that they are merely voidable at the instance
of the corporation or minority stockholders. 25 If there is a full, free
and frank disclosure, ratification by a disinterested majority has been
held convincing proof of the reasonableness of the compensation and is
usually binding on the minority.26 It would seem, then that the burden
of justifying the compensation as reasonable would be lifted from the
interested director and the dissentor would be called upon to justify
review by the courts through a showing of unreasonableness or oppres-
sion.2 7  While decisions have emphasized that there is no fiduciary
relationship between stockholders and the corporation and that directors
may vote their stock freely as stockholders,28 it should not follow that
they may effectively affirm their acts of self-dealing through ownership
of a majority of stock.P
" Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
732 (1929) ; Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., supra note 22; Blancard v. Blan-
card & Co., 96 N. 3. Eq. 264, 125 Adt. 337 (1924). Bad faith presumed: Schall v.
Althaus, 208 App. Div. 103, 203 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1924) ; Davids v. Davids, 135
App. Div. 206, 120 N. Y. Supp. 350 (1909).
"Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 91 N. E. 1056 (1910) ; McKey v. Swenson,
232 Mich. 505, 205 N. W. 583 (1925) ; Newcomer v. Mountain Springs Ice & Cold
Storage Co., 63 S. D. 81, 256 N. W. 359 (1934); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala.
486, 113 So. 516 (1927) semble; Fields v. Victor Bldg. & Loan Co., 73 Okla. 207,
175 Pac. 529 (1918) semble.
2 Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281
U. S. 732 (1929); Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Ad. 224 (1921);
Mathews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 At. 645 (1917) ; Francis v.
Brigham-Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Ad. 95 (1908); Lillard v. Oil, Paint &
Drug Co., 70 N. 3. Eq. 197, 56 At. 254 (1903) ; Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.,
153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236. 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914);
Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 At. 136 (1911). But see
Wood v. Myers Paper Co., 3 Tenn. App. 128 (1926).
" Diamond v. Davis, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 181 (1945); Putnam V. juvenile Shoe
Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925) (where ratification effected after institu-
tion of suit by minority); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky. 838, 171 S. W. 393 (1.924)
semble; cf. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 AtI. 293 (1931).
"See Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 208, 56 AtI. 254,
258 (1903).
"Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., supra note 27: Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler
Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101 At. 744 (1917); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232
Pa. 113, 81 AtI. 136 (1911).
" Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Godley v. Crandall
& Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E.
[Vol. 25
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Where the payment is unauthorized* the right of recovery is clear.30
It is a well-settled principle that directors and managing officers are not
entitled to compensation for ordinary and usual services incident to their
office in the absence of charter provision, by-law, or statute authorizing
payment or in the absence of express agreement.3 ' The underlying
concept is that, directors and managing officers occupying a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and stockholders, no promise to pay will be
implied. There is an increasing tendency, however, to allow the reason-
able value of the services rendered when it is shown that the services
were in fact valuable and circumstances raise a fair presumption that
payment was expected and intended.32 Where compensation has been
fixed by charter, by-law, resolution or agreement, additional compen-
sation may not be granted retroactively.33 Retroactive compensation is
without consideration and a gift, and as such constitutes a waste of
corporate property. Such payment being wrongful, it may be recovered
by the corporation or by the stockholders in a derivative action.3 4 Since
payment may originally be authorized by the stockholders, it would seem
that ratification by them would cure any defect or lack of authority of
the directors and preclude an attack upon this ground. It has been
held, however, that the majority has no power to ratify waste or a
gift over the protest of the minority and in oppression of their rights,35
and a ratification by less than all would be ineffective.
818 (1914) ; Holdridge v. Lloyd Garritson Co., 163 Wash. 1, 299 Pac. 657 (1931) ;
cf. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co, 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947);
see Camden Land Co. v. Lewis, 101 Me. 78, 101, 63 AtI. 523, 533 (1905) (ratifica-
tion by interested directors as stockholders not effective where action sought to be
ratified leads to inference that interests of the directors were foreign and hostile to
the corporation) ; Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 99, 25 N. E.
201, 202 (1890) (ratification not effective if evidence raises inference of bad
faith).
"'Actions involving the computation of bonuses, while essentially questions of
accounting, proceed on the theory of lack of authority for payment.
"15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNs §2109 (perm. ed. 1931); 3 THoMP-
SON, CoRPoRATioNs §1841 (1927); 19 C. J. S. Corporations, §803 (1940).
But where special, unusual 'or extraordinary services are rendered, an implied
promise to pay will be found. 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. §2114; 3 THOMPSON, op. cit.
§1853.
It is the general practice for charter or by-laws of the corporation to provide
for nominal fees for attendance of the directors at meetings. Note 32 'IrcH. L.
Rav. 672 (1934).
" Church v. Hamit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 4th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
732 (1929) ; cf. Rowland v. Demming Exploration Co., Trustees, 45 Idaho 99, 260
Pac. 579 (1919).
"3 Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) ; God-
Icy v. Crandall & Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y.
121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914); Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N. E. 2d 396(C. Pl. Ohio 1946).
" See note 33 supra.
"Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153 S. E. 240 (1930) ; cf Rogers v. Hill, 298
U. S. 582 (1933) ; Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A.
5th 1947).
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It is to be noted then that excessiveness standing alone will rarely
afford relief. The courts feel justified in interfering in the internal
affairs of corporations only when there is bad faith or lack of authority
for the remuneration. It is submitted that the principle case accords
with this view.
AUGUsT L. MEYLAND, JR.
Declaratory Judgment-Challenging Restrictive and Regulatory
Statutes-Requirement of a Specific Threat of Enforcement
to Justiciability
Certain individual civil service employees and the United Public
Workers of America sought an injunction against members of the Civil
Service Commission to restrain them from enforcing against petitioners
the provisions of the second sentence of §9(a) of the Hatch Act' and
a declaratory judgment that this sentence was unconstittitional. The
sentence reads, "No officer or employee in the executive branch of the
Federal Government ... shall take any active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns." Only one of the employees had actually
violated the provisions of the Act challenged. The others filed affidavits
in support of their complaint in which they expressed a desire to engage
in specified political activities which they understood were forbidden by
the challenged sentence. Held, that the latter had not made out a
justiciable case or controversy on which to grant the relief prayed for.2
Only six justices out of seven3 sitting on the case made a direct pro-
nouncement on this particular point, four 4 holding no justiciable case
or controversy, two5 holding that there was." The majority found no
actual interference with petitioners' rights, and only a hypothetical threat
'53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. §61h(a) (Supp. 1946).
2 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed.
(Adv. Ops.) 509 (1947).
An adjudication on the merits, declaring the challenged sentence constitutional,
was had in this case, all the justices finding a justiciable case presented by the
employee who had actually violated the challenged sentence. On the merits the
decision was four to three, Justices Rutledge and Douglas dissenting because of
the particular status of the violating employee, that of an industrial worker, and
Justice Black on the grounds that the challenged provision was unconstitutional
on its face.3 Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case. -Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority
on the merits, but thought that the case should be dismissed as to all the petition-
ers for want of jurisdiction on another procedural basis.
'Justices Reed, Rutledge, Vinson, and Burton.
'Justices Black and Douglas.
'Although injunctive as well as declaratory relief was prayed for, consideration
of justiciability seems to have been confined to the prerequisites for declaratory
relief as presenting the minimum requirements. Therefore this note is also confined
to that area. For an exhaustive analysis of the point under consideration see Bor-
chard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L. J. 445
(1943) ; and Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1278 (1941).
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of such interference, which they thought not sufficient. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in dissent, said, "The threat against them is real not fanciful,
immediate not remote. The case is therefore an actual not a hypothetical
one."7 But Mr. Justice Black found justiciability by reason of the mere
existence of the Act and the petitioners' compliance with it at a sacrifice
by them of asserted civil rights.
Thus it is seen that all but one of the justices deciding this point
demanded at least an actual threat of interference as a condition prece-
dent to justiciability; they differed only in that the majority found at
best a hypothetical threat, while the one dissent thought it real. Only
one seems to have considered seriously the possibility that the mere
existence of the Act could constitute a present deprivation of petitioners'
rights, by reason of their manifest compliance with its prohibitions.8 This
is striking in view of the fact that this argument was directly urged in
the petitioners' brief,9 and was made in the district court's finding of
justiciability cited by Justice Douglas in dissent.:'
The threat which the five justices were searching for was a threat
of enforcement of the sanctions which give the prohibition its teeth, in
this case mandatory dismissal from employment by the Commission.
This approach to the problem seems to put undue emphasis on an ele-
ment of any penal statute which is merely incidental to its main purpose
of prohibiting or regulating a certain area of activity. It assumes the
unrealistic attitude that a person whose activities are within the pur-
view of the statute can only be affected thereby when its sanctions are
enforced against him. Professor Borchard has succinctly stated the
pre-enforcement effect of such a statute:
"As a rule, the mere enactment of a statute or ordinance im-
posing restraints on an individual and implying enforcement by
prosecuting officials threatens and hampers the plaintiff's freedom,
peace of mind or pecuniary interests, and creates that justiciability
" United Public Workers v. Mitchell, cited supra note 2, at 579, 91 L. Ed. at
533.
' The majority opinion may be construed as having considered the point, re-jecting it because of uncertainty as to the exact activities being prohibited. But in
view of the obvious restraints imposed by the verbiage of the sentence, supple-
mented by direct commission prohibitions against specified activities cited by Jus-
tice Black in dissent, United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 573,
91 L. Ed. at 527, its consideration can only be deemed cursory. The case cited by
the majority in this connection, Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
325 U.. S. 450 (1944), is distinguishable. There the key prohibitory word in a
challenged state statute was "functioning," and the Court quite obviously thought
it too vague and uncertain in view of, its lack of construction by the state court
or application by enforcing officers to make possible more than speculation as to
the exact activities being prohibited by its existence.
"Even when not inflicted in specific cases, the statutory prohibition and pen-
alty have the present effect of deterring lawful conduct, and thus inflict the injury
of deprivation of constitutional rights." Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 5, United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra note 8.
"0 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 577, 91 L. Ed. at 531, 532.
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of the issue which sustains a proceeding for an injunction, and,
a fortiori, for a declaratory judgment." '1
Can explanation be found for the Supreme Court's refusal to con-
sider this pre-enforcement effect of the statute as creating justiciability?
The inquiry becomes more pertinent in view of the fact that the Court
has in the past found justiciability on just such a basis. 12 In these cases,
the sole prayer for relief was injunction, and in granting such relief in
the Terrace, Pierce, and Euclid cases it has been urged that the Supreme
Court permitted an abuse of the injunctive process in that in its zeal to
relieve from the pre-enforcement burden it did not require any showing
of irreparable injury or inadequacy or legal remedy.13 Now, confronted
with the same type situation and armed with a new procedure, the
statutory declaratory action, which does not require irreparable injury or
inadequacy of legal remedy as a prerequisite of equitable jurisdiction,
the court fails to find justiciability.
Two explanations may be suggested. The early misgivings with
which the Court regarded the declaratory judgment procedure 4 may not
have been entirely dissipated by its final acceptance of the procedure in
state' 5 and federal 16 courts, so that they still influence to a great extent
its test of justiciability. In no use of the procedure have these misgiv-
1 BORCHARW, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 966 (2d ed. 1941).
Columbia System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 418 (1942) (in granting
an injunction against the enforcement of an FCC order requiring the refusal of
license to any broadcasting station which entered into certain prohibited contracts
with networks, petitioner not yet having been refused such license, the Court said,
"Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-executing, but require
judicial or administrative action to impose their sanctions with respect to par-
ticular individuals .. . a valid exercise of the rule-making power is addressed to
and sets a standard for all to whom its terms apply. It operates as such in advance
of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual. It is common ex-
perience that men conform their conduct to regulations by governmental authority
so as to avoid the unpleasant legal consequences which failure to conform en-
tails. . . . It is alleged without contradiction that numerous affiliated stations
have conformed to the regulations to avoid loss of their licenses with consequent
injury to appellant. Such regulations have the force of law before their sanctions
are invoked as well as after. When, as here, . . . the expected conformity to
them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity, they are appropriately the sub-
ject of attack....") ; City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)
(injunction restraining enforcement of zoning ordinance before petitioner had even
applied for building permit) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1924)
(injunction restraining, enforcement of state statute two years before its effective
date; present deprivation of property rights) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197
(1923) (Washington statute forbade land ownership by certain alieis; injunction
issued restraining enforcement thereof against petitioner who alleged merely that
he wished to sell land to such an alien, on grounds unconstitutional).
"s See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 434, 435; but cf. Note, 3 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 248 (1934).1 Piedmont and Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930) ; Lib-
erty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers, 276 U. S. 71 (1928); Liberty
Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927).
" Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286 (1934); Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
" Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
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ings been more apparent than where declarations on constitutional issues
were sought. The reasons for this wariness with respect to constitu-
tional issues have not been expressly announced by the Court, but others
have attempted explanation,' 7 and some have praised the Court's atti-
tude to the extent of advocating exception of these cases from the pur-
view of the Federal Act.' s The general tenor of these discussions is
that an all-out use of the declaratory procedure in constitutional cases
will cloak the Supreme Court with practical veto power over state and
federal legislation, at a sacrifice of the traditional function of the judi-
ciary. But, admitting to some extent the .validity of this argument,
although it has been met on its own grbund with much force by the
greatest authority on this procedure, 19 it is submitted that in the par-
ticular field under consideration, some retreat from the traditional
judicial function is warranted. If it be admitted that such statutes as
the one under consideration may operate from their inceptions as uncon-
stitutional deprivations of rights, should there not be a remedy, and that
as speedily as possible? The declaratory judgment procedure seems to
be hand-made for the purpose; Congress evidently contemplated its pre-
enforcement use in enacting the Federal Act.20 If it cannot be availed
of by an aggrieved party in such cases, it appears that here is a wrong
without a remedy except when the aggrieved party has submitted him-
self by violation to further injury. This should not be a condition prece-
dent to obtaining relief.2 '
The Court's requirement of a threat of enforcement may be ex-
plained, aside from the general policy grounds set out above, on a pro-
cedural basis. The immunity of both the individual states2 and the
United States23 to actions testing the constitutionality of their legislative
enactments results in the necessity of bringing such actions against the
proper enforcing officer as distinguished from the sovereign. This
focuses attention at the outset on enforcement by the officer rather than
17 See TBURMAN ARNOLD, SYMDOLS OF GOVERNMENT 186 (1935).
18Notes, 51 HARv. L. IEv. 1267 (1938) ; 45 HAav. L. RE. 1089 (1932).19Borchard, Declaratory Judgmenas in Federal Courts, 41' YALE L. J. 1195(1932) ; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra notes 11, 13, at 766-770.20 See SEN. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1934).1 See Mr. Justice Butler, in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 216, 'They
are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of
property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights!'2 The doctrine of state immunity to such actions, its inception and effect are
discussed in Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1925). The
fiction that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute is
actually a personalized action against the attorney-general, divested of official capac-
ity, had its inception in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1907).
'The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act did not enlarge the area of the
susceptibility of the United States to suit beyond that set out by the Tucker Act
and other statutory provisions. Of course if a declaratory judgment action to
determine the constitutionality of an Act of Congress can be brought within the
area delimited by those special statutory provisions the United States may be
made a party defendant.
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the sovereign's enactment as the wrong complained of, so that require-
ment of threat of enforcement naturally follows. This procedural re-
quirement should not be allowed to be-cloud the obvious adverse interest
which the sovereign has in such actions. The doctrine of state immunity
to such actions as derived from the Eleventh Amendment has been
criticized as conflicting with the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
to afford protection against state enactments.24  The Judiciary Act of
193725 provides for intervention by the United States in cases, including
declaratory judgment actions, where the constitutionality of an act of
Congress is involved. This seems to be a tacit Congressional recognition
that in such proceedings the United States has a definite adversary in-
terest, although the action cannot be brought against the United States
in the first instance. The effect of the sovereign immunity doctrine on
the type of cases under consideration is made apparent by the fact that
pre-enforcement declaratory judgment actions challenging municipal
ordinances, where the municipality itself can be made the party defend-
ant, have probably had the most success in this field, insofar as hav-
ing the Court recognize justiciability of the issue is concerned. 2  How-
ever, these cases might be explained also by the fact that state courts
generally have been less prone to require a showing of threatened
enforcement. So that even where a state statute is challenged and the
enforcing officer is made the party defendant, state courts have usually
found pre-enforcement justiciability.=2 If this procedural requirement
" Note, 50 HAiRv. L. REv. 956 (1937).
" 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U. S. C. A. §401 (Supp. 1946).
" Lisenba v. Griffin, 242 Ala. 661, 8 So. 2d 175 (1942) (regulating operation
of barber shops; in this case the City Barber Board made party defendant rather
than the municipality); Dowdy v. City of Covington, 237 Ky. 274, 35 S. W. 2d
304 (1931) (regulation of moving van business); Barron v. Minneapolis, 212
Minn. 566, 4 N. W. 2d 622 (1942) (regulating owning and operation of coin-
vending machines used for sale of edibles); Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New
York, 295 N. Y. 527, 68 N. E. 2d 593 (1946) (regulating sale of horse meat
for animal feed) ; 432 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 184 Misc. 1001, 55
N. Y. S. 2d 203 (1945) (zoning ordinance; but court stressed fact that here
petitioner could be considered as stating a grievance on behalf of a large group
and that more was involved than merely the unique problem of a particular land-
owner); Drake v. City of Portland, 172 Ore. 558, 143 P. 2d 213 (1943) (civil
service commission order reclassifying employees); Vermont Salvage Corp. v.
Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188 (1943) (regulating junk
dealers). But cf. Witschner v. City of Atchison, 154 Kan. 212, 117 P. 2d 570
(1941) (declaratory judgment that certain type pin-ball machines was not within
purview of anti-gambling statute refused; distinction should be made between 1ala
in se criminal statutes and those merely inala prohibitum).
27 American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145
(1944) (regulating labor unions); Doyle v. Clark, 220 Ind. 271, 41 N. E. 2d
949 (1942) (regulating sale of alcoholic beverages in certain stores under certain
conditions); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A. 2d 880 (1944) (regulating
advertising by physicians and surgeons; granted despite procedural error of join-
ing state as party defendant); Chronicle & Gazette Publishing Co. v. Att'y Gen'l,
- N. H. - , 48 A. 2d 478 (1946) (regulating political advertisement rates) ;
statute violated, but apparently no threat of enforcement); Arnold v. Board of
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is indeed a factor in the test of pre-enforcement justiciability the United
States Supreme Court seems peculiarly influenced by it.
With increasing state and federal legislation regulating business
activities and civil rights,28 it is safe to assume that persons such as
petitioners in the instant case will continue to resort to the declaratory
judgment procedure as a possible mode of obtaining surcease from the
restraints of such legislation before actually violating its provisions. The
fact that their chances of even getting such complaints considered on
their merits will probably vary with the place of the enacting legislature
and of the court in the governmental hierarchy is an anomaly. The
anomaly is the more serious because the higher the prestige, and prob-
ably the effect, of such legislation, the less opportunity there will be for
obtaining pre-enforcement relief.
A repudiation of the doctrine of Ex parte Young9 to lift state im-
munity from such actions, and legislation making the United States
suable in such actions might help to de-emphasize the threat of enforce-
ment as a factor and lead to its repudiation by the highest Court for
reasons already suggested. However, if this procedural aspect be not the
crux of the problem, but merely a handy device to buttress the Supreme
Court's desire not to handle such cases before actual violation as a matter
of policy,30 then the anomoly will probably remain until the court recon-
siders this policy in the light of the quandary in which it places the
affected individuals, and therein finds it wanting. Perhaps the dissent
in the instant case, particularly that of Mr. Justice Black, presages such
a reconsideration.
J. DicxsoN PHILLIPS, JR.
Evidence-Employer's Vicarious Liability for Negligent Operation
of Automotive Vehicle-Presumptions from Ownership
In Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines,1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held in a four to three decision that the plaintiff failed to make
Barber Examiners, 45 N. M. 57, 109 P. 2d 779 (1941) (regulating prices in
barber shops). Contra: De Cano v. State, 7 Wash. 2d 613, 110 P. 2d 627 (1941).
For earlier cases to the same effect as these and those in note 26, supra, see
BORcHARD, op. cit. supra, at 969-971, and cases there collected.
" Prqbably most striking recent examples are those federal and state measures
designed to curb subversive activities, particularly among federal and state em-
ployees. The president's executive order "prescribing procedure for the adminis-
tration of an employee's loyalty program in the executive branch of the govern-
ment," Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947), has already been ques-
tioned by eminent jurists as respects its procedural sufficiency. Chafee, Griswold,
Katz, and Scott, The Loyalty Order, N. Y. Times, April 13, 1947, §4, p. 8E, col. 4.
A recent example of state legislation on the same subject is North Carolina's
amendment to N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-12 (1943) by (1947) session of N. C. Gen-
eral Assembly, S. B. No. 1028; H. B. No. 980.
"' See notes 22 and 24 supra. "8 See notes 17 and 18 supra.
L227 N. C. 193, 41 S. E. 2d 586 (1947).
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a case under the doctrine of respondeat superior and should have been
nonsuited below. His evidence was that about 1:15 a.m. he was awak-
ened by '!an awful noise!' and found that a large tractor-trailer type
truck had crashed into his. combihed cafe and living quarters, .which was
100 .feet from" an intersection, and that the truck and trailer had the
name- of. the defendant painted thereon. Plaintiff -further testified, over
objection; that Belton King, while- standing beside the tractor which
was inside the cafe,, said that he was driving the truck; that he fell asleep
aiid lost control -of the truck, and "tore it all to pieces." The statement
was made. two minutes after the collision. The defendant in itg answer
admitted only that it is engaged in the business of hauling freight by
motor truck upon the highways of North Carolina and other states.
There was no evidence that the truck was or had ever been used in the
business" of the defendant. Neither was there any evidence that the
driver was then or had ever been in the employ of the defendant. The
defendant denied all the essential allegations of the complaint, so the
plaintiff was put to proof of every fact necessary to support' his action.
The defendant, having no duty to explain, offered no evidence. On
appeal, to sustain his recovery against the owner, the plaintiff relied on
a presumption of agency supposedly established by Jeffrey v. Osage
Mfg. Co.2 However, the defendant relied on the same authurity and
the court cited that case as settling the question, that there is no pre-
sumption of liability from ownership of a motor vehicle in North Caro-
lina. The driver's declaration was ruled out, as inadmissible against this
defendant.3 The plaintiff, having no evidence in the record. on agency
and scope of employment, failed to make a prima facie case; his recov-
ery was reversed.
It is said that the plaintiff.must offer competent evidence on four
essentials, requisite elements, to establish a prima facie case for the jury:
(1) that the truck or automobile inflicting the injury was at the time
operated in a negligent manner, or that the driver thereof was guilty of
negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury, (2) where the
driver or operator of the conveyance at the time of the injury was other
-than the owner, the plaintiff must offer evidence tending to show the
ownership of the vehicle if such owner is sought to be charged with the
negligence of the driver or operator, (3) that if the injury was caused
by the negligence of an agent, evidence must be offered tending to estab-
lish the agency, (4) that the agent or employee at the time of the injury
was acting within the scope of his employment as contemplated and
defined by law.4
-197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
See note 37 infra, for discussion.
' Smith v. Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941); Van
Landingham v. Sewing Machine Co., 207 N. C. 355, 177 S. E. 126 (1934); Cole
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Difficulty in obtaining evidence tending to prove the element of neg-
ligence and proximate cause is no greater than in other negligence
cases. If ownership is not stipulated, there is usually enough circum-
stantial evidence available to prove it. In certain cases no evidence of
ownership is required.5 However, sufficient evidence tending to prove
agency,6 and even if that be conceded, then evidence tending to prove
that ihe transaction out of which the injury arose was within the scope
of employment of the agent,7 is extremely difficult to produce. This is
true since no one but the employer and employee could, if they would,
furnish direct evidence on these elements and the thin mist of circum-
stantial evidence may have evaporated during the interval before the
plaintiff's attorney is given the case.
The dissenting opinion, recognizing the plaintiff's plight and observ-
ing the defendant's silence, advocates allowing a "presumption" of the
third and fourth elements to arise from the introduction of evidence of
negligence of the driver and ownership of the truck by the defendant.8
Such a presumption, better labeled an inference of fact,9 would force
the apparent truck owner to clarify the-issues by offering the facts pecu-
liarly within his knowledge or risk an adverse verdict. It is not a
change in the substantive law, but in the quantum or mechanics of proof
that is called for.
It will be interesting to note the existing judicial handicap to just
compensation under the doctrine of respondeat superior in. North Car-
v. Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1933) ; Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.,
197 N. C. 724. 150 S. E. 503 (1929) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E.
501 (1929) ; Cotton v. Transportation Co., 197 N. C. 709 150 S. 1. 505 (1929).5 Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 39, 12 S. S. 2d 667, 669 (1941) ("This
court has adopted the view that the employer is liable where the employee causes
an injury by the negligent operation of his own car, used in the prosecution of
the employer's business, when the latter knew, or should have known, that he was
so using it."); Barrow v. Keel, 213 N. C. 373, 196 S. E. 366 (1938) ; Miller v.
Wood, 210 N. C. 520, 187 S. E. 765 (1936) ; Donalson v. Western Union, 207 N. C.
790, 178 S. E. 603 (1935) ; see note, 140 A. L. R. 1150 (1942).
'Brown v. Wood, 201 N. C. 309, 312, 160 S. E. 281, 283 (1931) (where owner
visited hospitalized plaintiff, offered to pay medical bills, and said "everything was
all right," held to be susceptible of broad meaning and interpretation, a jury ques-
tion as this evidence was competent to prove agency).
' Salmon v. Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 589, 27 S. E. 2d 647, 649 (1943) ("Proof
of general employment alone is not sufficient to impose liability. It must be made
to appear that the particular act in which the employee was at the time engaged
was within the scope of his employment and was being performed in the further-
ance of the master's business."); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E.
2d 283 (1940) (relation of master and servant must exist at time of and: in re-
spect to very transaction out of which the injury arose).
8 Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines, 227 N. C. 193, 199, 41 S. E. 2d 586, 590
(1947).9 Pozzobon v. Q'Donnell, 36 P. 2d 236 (1934) (instruction that law presumes
person operating automobile is doing so as agent of owner held to be erroneous
because of use of word "presumes" instead of word "infers," that is, the jury from
proof of ownership may draw conclusion that driver was acting as agent of
owner, but it is not bound to do so).
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olina and also the background occasioning the timely opinion of Justice
Seawell and the minority. Only an analysis of North Carolina cases of
imputed negligence has been attempted. 0 An effort has been made to
avoid the partially distinct and partially overlapping phases of the doc-
trine of respondeat superior; namely, the liability of the owner of the
"family car,"' 1 and the liability of the employer to the invitee passenger
of his driver.'2
Broad language of a comparatively early case supports the proposed
view. 1 3 In 1918 Chief Justice Clark stated, "The natural presumption
is that one who is employed in operating an automobile is doing so in
the service of the owner . . it will be difficult for the plaintiff in such
cases to show that the automobile was being driven and operated under
the direct supervision of the owner, which was a matter peculiarly in
the owner's knowledge. We thing there was error to nonsuit the plain-
"0 The owner or person in control, being liable, for his own negligence, is not
liable for that of another, gratuitously using the automobile. McLamb v. Beasley,
218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940); Robertson v. Aldrige, 185 N. C. 292,
116 S. E. 742 (1923) (automobile is not inherently dangerous) ; Linville v. Nissen,
162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913) ; Cook v. Home, 198 N. C. 739, 153 S. E. 315(1930) (furnishing unlighted vehicle at night, negligence per se) ; Jones v. Stancil,
198 N. C. 541, 52 S. E. 492 (1930) ; Taylor v. Caudle, 210 N. C. 60, 185 S. E. 446(1936) (owner negligent in intrusting automobile to reckless and incompetent
driver; one given to habitual and excessive use of liquor) ; Hoke v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 226 N. C. 692, 40 S. E. 2d 345 (1946) (owner may be negligent
in permitting 13-year-old daughter to drive) ; see note, 42 A. L. R. 899 (1926).
"lVaughn v. Booker, 217 N. C. 479, 481, 8 S. E. 2d 603, 604 (1940) ("True,
it is the recognized principle that a parent is not ordinarily responsible for the
torts of a minor child, solely by reason of the relationship, and that generally
liability will only be imputed on some principle of agency or employment. But it
is also held in our opinions by the great weight of authority that where a parent
owns a car for the convenience and pleasure of the family, a minor child, who is
a member of the family, though using the car at the time for his own purposes,
with the parent's consent or approval, will be regarded as representing the parent
in such use, and the question of liability for negligent injury may be considered
and determined in that aspect. It will be noted that the very genesis of the family
purpose car doctrine is agency, and the question here presented is governed by
the rules of principal and agent or of master and servant.") ; Hawes v. Haynes,
219 N. C. 535, 14 S. E. 2d 503 (1941) (evidence of prior use by others, mem-
bers of owner's family, necessary); Wallace v. Squires, 186 N. C. 339, 119 S. E.
569 (1923) (where there was evidence that son habitually used family car, it was
incumbent upon father to show that son had no permission at that particular time
to drive that car).
" Russell v. Cutshall, 223 N. C. 353, 354, 26 S. E. 2d 866, 867 (1943)("Ordinarily, one who is engaged to operate a motor vehicle has no implied
authority, by virtue of his employment, to invite or permit third persons to ride;
the employer is not liable for personal injuries sustained by the invitee while riding
in such machine except, perhaps where willfully or maliciously inflicted.");
Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N. C. 270, 176 S. E. 568 (1934) (to recover for
ordinary negligence there need be evidence that driver was transporting passenger
for or on behalf of the owner) ; Cotton v. Transportation Co., 197 N. C. 709, 150
S. E. 505 (1929); Peters et al. v. A. & P. et al., 194 N. C. 173, 138 S. E. 595(1927); see Note, 8 N. C. L. REv. 306 (1930).
" Sutton v. Lyons, 156 N. C. 3, 72 S. E: 4 (1911) (although often cited as
allowing the presumption from ownership of an automobile, the case merely pre-
sents a comparable situation where agency was presumed; held, to be defendant's
duty to affirmatively show that she was not operator of mill situated on her land).
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tiff."'1 4 However, a survey of subsequent cases shows the unpredictabil-
ity of suffering a nonsuit.
No case directly in point where both agency and scope of employment
were inferred has been found. One case, where the precise point was not
involved, contemplated that it might be done.' 5 But, there is a distinct
line of authority granting one-half the proposed inference.'6 Scope of
employment has repeatedly been inferred from evidence tending to prove
agency. However, the defendants attorney can find an equally strong
line of cases, where the inference was not allowed. 17 Neither line of
cases entertain an unbroken chronological sequence.
Leading cases allowing the inference of scope of employment include
Freeman v. Dalton's where it is stated, "There may be a presumption
that the car was being used in the defendant's business, but it is not a
presumption of law, but one of fact, and it does not shift the burden of
the issue to the defendant in the sense that he must rebut the presump-
tion, or disprove the allegations by the greater weight of the evidence.
It merely is, in itself, evidence of the fact and carries the case to the
jury." It has been said that Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.'9 limits the
doctrine, ° possibly due to the court's terse restatement of the facts as
follows: "A truck, which is in itself a business vehicle devoted ex-
clusively to business purposes, is found on the highway on a business
day during business hours, operated by the regular employee of the
defendant and one whose regular business or employment was the duty
' Clark v. Sweaney, 175 N. C. 280, 95 S. E. 568 (1918).
"
8Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C. 538, 111 S. E. 863 (1922) (distinguished in
Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 135 S. E. 852 (1926), limited by Martin v. Bus
Line, 197 N. C. 720, 724, 150 S. E. 501, 503 (1929) by quotation, 'Every opinion,
to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which
it was delivered, Marshall, C. J., U. S. v. Burr, 4 Cranch, 470.').
" Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. 2d 667 (1941); West v. Baking
Co., 2(3 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935); Puckett v. Dyer, 203 N. C. 684, 167
S. E. 43 (1932) ; Lewis v. Basketeria Stores, Inc., 201 N. C. 849, 161 S. E. 924
(1931); Lazarus v. Grocery Co., 201 N. C. 817, 161 S. E. 553 (1931); Jeffrey
v. Osage Mfg. Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929); Misenheimer v. Hayman,
195 N. C. 613, 143 S. E. 1 (1928); Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C. 538, 111 S. E.
863 (1922).
"
7 Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Smith v. Moore, 220 N. C. 165,
16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283
(1940); Tribble v. Swinson, 213 N. C. 550, 196 S. E. 820 (1938); Swicegood v.
Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937); Cole v. Funeral Home, 207
N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1934) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E.
501 (1929) ; Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 130 S. E. 617 (1926) ; Reich v. Cone,
180 N. C. 267, 104 S. E. 530 (1913).I8 183 N. C. 538, 111 S. E. 863 (1922).
10 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929).
"- Brown v. Wood, 201 N. C. 309, 160 S. E. 291 (1931) (where the court
phrased the question on appeal, "Does proof of ownership of a pleasure car con-
stitute a prima facie case of liability against the owner for injuries resulting from
the negligent operation thereof by the driver? The law answers the question in
the negative," and cited Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.,. 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503(1929).
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of driving- and operating said vehicle. We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that these facts furnish a sound and reasonable basis for a jury
to infer that the truck at the time was being operated in the furtherance
of the master's business." This case was submitted to the jury although
the defendant offered uncontradicted evidence that the driver had taken
the truck during the lunch hour without permission and to visit his sick
mother near whose house the collision occurred. Merely from the
answer an inference was allowed in West v. Baking Co.21 where the
defendant admitted "that the defendant driver was an employee of the
company .. that as -such employee was authorized and directed from
time to time to drive said truck." This was held to be evidence tending
to prove that the employee was driving the truck within the scope of
his employment at the time of the injury. Where an insurance collector
had made a collection a few minutes before the accident, which was in
the middle of the afternoon of a working day, the court held that from
these facts a reasonable inference could be drawn that the employee was
engaged in the duties of his employment -and that this inference could
not be defeated in the few minutes it took the employee to drive to the
scene of the accident, still within his territory,22 and cited the principle:
"That where it is doubtful whether a servant in injuring a third person
was acting within the scope of his authority, it has been said that the
doubt will be resolved against the master because he set the servant in
motion. '23 However, there was a similar division of the court as in the
instant case. The three dissenting justices concluded that the evidence
was not sufficient to be submitted to the jury in that "it fails to show
that the relation of master and servant existed... at the time of and in
respect to the very transaction out of whih the injury arose, a fatal
defect in the plaintiff's case," and even cited Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co.
as supporting their view.
Leading cases adhering to strict proof of the elements of the owner's
liability by the plaintiff include Grier v. Grier,24 where an automobile
salesman was driving a "demonstration" car and by the defendant's
evidence was on a pleasure trip. The court spoke of a requirement that
evidence should be in the record of an act in furtherance of the em-
ployer's business. In Cole v. Funeral Home25 it was held that the doc-
trine in Jeffrey v. Osage Mfg. Co. was not applicable, although the
injury occurred duriifg regular business hours, for there was no evidence
that the automobile was a business vehicle and there was no competent
evidence that the driver was engaged in the business of his employer.
21208 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935).22PinnL' v. Griffin, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. 2d 667 (1941).
'-39 C. J. 1274 (1925).
'4 192 N. C. 760, 130 S. E. 617 (1926).
2- 207 N. C. 271, 176 S. E. 553 (1934).
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In McLamb v. Beasley26 the regular driver was permitted to take the
delivery truck home each evening, a distance of three miles. Plaintiff
offered the defendant's bookkeeper who testified, ". . . and if anything
should have to be hauled or delivered after the store was closed, we could
get in touch with him and he would do it ... not in all the -time I worked
there did I ever know Hood to be called on during the night. He was
simply working there, and we all felt, if an emergency arose, we were
liable to be called on." It was held that this evidence, in its entirety,
expressed no more than a sense of loyalty on the part of the employees
of the defendant and that it did not even carry the suggestion that
Hood had the truck in order that he might be accessible after closing
hours. The defendant did not offer evidence. The dissenting opinion
stated, "The fact that he did not deny the wrong done by his driver was
a pregnant circumstance for the jury to consider."
When the inference has been denied, the plaintiff's difficulty in prov-
ing the owner's liability for his driver's negligence during business hours
is readily seen. The difficulty is increased when the tort occurs after
normal business hours.2 7 Sunday cases present additional obstacles.
28
In Smith v. Moore29 the plaintiff changed his plans for the Sunday eve-
ning and accepted the salesman's invitation to dinner in a nearby town
and drove the salesman's "demonstration" car to that place at the re-
quest of the salesman to "try it out." Several months previously, the
salesman and his employer had interviewed the plaintiff as a prospective
purchaser of a car. After dinner, on the way home, the salesman driv-
ing, plaintiff was negligently injured and recovered from the employer.
However, the appellate opinion held that the plaintiff should have been
nonsuited as to this defendant for "the record clearly discloses that the
request that plaintiff drive Yelton's car on the trip over and 'try it out'
was purely incidental to the primary purpose, which was social. Even
if we conceded that the trip was in part for demonstration purposes ...
which is not supported by the evidence, the business ended and the party
was on as soon as they gathered at the home of Mrs. Cos."
We might assume, even if the law of respondeat superior in North
:6 218 N. C. 308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940).
'Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N. C.
308, 11 S. E. 2d 283 (1940) ; Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C. 720, 150 S. E. 501
(1929) ; Peters et al. v. A. & P. Tea Co. et al., 194 N. C. 173, 138 S. E. 595 (1927).
"Smith v. Moore, 220 N. C. 165, 16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941); Riddle v. Whis-
nant, 220 N. C. 131, 16 S. E. 2d 698 (1941) (where the Act of 1741, N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §103-1, which assesses a penalty of one dollar on those who
exercise the work of their ordinary calling on Sunday, is cited); Tyson v.
Frutchey, 194 N. C. 750, 140 S. E. 718 (1927) ; Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760, 130
S. E. 617 (1926).
"29220 N. C. 165, 16 S. E. 2d 701 (1941) (liability of master is not to be
determined by the extent of authority of agent, but by purpose of act in which
agent was engaged at the time).
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Carolina be settled, that the plaintiffs in substantially similar cases re-
ceive unequal justice due to the uncertain value of shreds of circum-
stantial evidence."" The defendant may offer evidence that the driver
was on a personal venture and the plaintiff, having no knowledge of facts
to the contrary, may find himself nonsuited ;31 especially is this true for
injuries caused by vehicles other than of a recognized business type.32
The defendant may remain silent, even may leave unexplained how a
large tractor-trailer bearing his name left the highway in the early
morning hours and wrought havor as in the instant case. He should be
required to offer evidence that it was stolen or leased, 33 or that he loaned
the large expensively operated vehicle to someone for a pleasure trip
and have the credibility of that explanation tested by the jury. Some-
times the plaintiff overlooks the available authority for an inference of
scope of employment,34 but always he has the risk that all the evidence
available to him tending to prove agency will be determined a mere
scintilla.35 The plaintiff in his efforts to produce sufficient evidence of
agency and scope may prove himself out of court.,3 Again, he may
rely too heavily on the admissibility of the utterances of the driver, made
at the scene, and discover too late that he has nothing left when they
are ruled out as hearsay a7 From the very nature of the action, the
" Misenheimer v. Hayman, 195 N. C. 613, 614, 143 S. E. 1, 2 (1928) (Plaintiff's
recovery was sustained over defendant's contention that there was no evidence of
scope of employment. "There is at least some evidence that the driver of the truck
was acting within the scope of his authority and in the furtherance of his master's
business ... there is evidence that his truck was frequently seen on the road in
question coming from and returning to the city, according to one witness, some-
times once a day and sometimes every other day. While the evidence on the
point is not necessarily convincing we cannot hold as a matter of law that it is
devoid of such probative force as not to require its submission to the jury.").
"'Rogers v. Black Mountain, 224 N. C. 119, 29 S. E. 2d 203 (1944) ; Swice-
good v. Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937).
" Smith v. Mariakakis, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945); Salmon v.
Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Grier v. Grier, 192 N. C. 760,
130 S. E. 617 (1926).
" By proper phrasing of a "trip lease," the owner, though paying the driver's
regular wages, may relieve himself from liability for the driver's negligence for
lessee shipper was held responsibile on respondeat superior; therefore by implica-
tion the owner is not liable. Wood v. Miller, 226 N. C. 567, 39 S. E. 2d 608(1946).
3S Salmon v. Pearce, 223 N. C. 587, 27 S. E. 2d 647 (1943); Swicegood v.
Swift and Co., 212 N. C. 396, 193 S. E. 277 (1937).
"&Smith v. Mariakalds, 226 N. C. 100, 36 S. E. 2d 651 (1945) (plaintiff's wife
testified that she saw the driver in the defendant's cafe, cleaning tables on the night
of the accident, and had seen him there practically every day).
" The plaintiff of necessity offers the driver as his witness, who testifies that
his was a pleasure trip, and is unable to secure rontradictory evidence that the
driver was on the business of the owner. Riddle v. Whisnant, 220 N. C. 131, 16
S. E. 2d 698 (1941).
87 North Carolina courts in recent years have tended to make it harder to get
in extra-judicial admissions of agents. This is shown by the fact they exclude
them to prove agency. Agency must be shown aliunde before the agent's admis-
sion will be received. Hunsucher v. Corbitt, 187 N. C. 496, 122 S. E. 378 (1924).
More recent cases exclude them as proof of scope of employment. Caulder v.
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plaintiff is unable to secure the competent judicial admissions of the
frightened employee who is fearful of his continued employment. Extra-
judicial admissions of the driver need to be distinguished from those
infrequently made by the owner which are competent if relevant.38
Since the plaintiff has the burden of producing all the evidence, the
owner or more often his insurers, by answering in denials under the
supposed wisdom of preventing unfounded claims, places an often in-
surmountable burden on the plaintiff. Of what value is a judgment
against a financially irresponsible driver? We might observe that the
owners of vehicles who employ chauffeurs and the owners of commercial
vehicles have definite tactical if not legal advantage over the injured
plaintiff; whereas, the negligent owner who drives his own vehicle is
liable solely on proof of negligence proximately causing the injury.
The rule of the majority of jurisdictions is that proof of ownership
of the automobile by the defendant at the time of the accident creates
a prima facie case by inference that the negligent operator was the
servant or agent of the defendant and was engaged in his business,
acting within the scope. of his employment. 39 When adopted by statute
the rule has been interpreted to be a rule of evidence only ;40 however,
at least one jurisdiction regards it as a change in the substantive law.41
Sound reasons advanced in the decided cases for the adoption of
the inference, whether by statute or judicial decision, include the fol-
lowing: (1) That if the defendant is in fact the owner, it should be
easier for him to bring forward evidence showing that the driver was
not his servant or not acting within his scope of employment.42 (2) That
experience demonstrates that the probabilities are that an automobile
figuring in an accident will be driven by the owner or by someone for
Motor Sales, Inc., 221 N. C. 437, 20 S. E. 2d 338 (1942); STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EviDENCE §169 (1946). Barnhill, J., by dicta, in the instant case says,
"Even if said statement constitutes a part of the res gestae, it is not admissible
against this defendant as evidence, either of negligence or agency, for the reason
the record fails to disclose any testimony tending to show that he was at the time
the agent of the defendant." If this be adopted, it is a new restriction for the
admission is clearly evidence of negligence when part of the res gestae, notwith-
standing agency, for even that of a by-stander would be. Queen City Coach
Co. v. Lee, 218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. 2d 341 (1940); STANSBURY, NORTn CAR-
OLINA EvmENcE §164 (1946).
as Toler v. Savage, 226 N. C. 209, 37 S. E. 2d 485 (1946); Tribble v. Swin-
son, 213 N. C. 550, 196 S. E. 820 (1938).
" See Notes, 122 A. L. R. 228 (1939), 96 A. L. R. 634 (1935), 74 A. L. R.
951 (1931), 42 A. L. R. 898 (1926).
Greenbury v. Gorvine, 279 Mass. 339, 181 N. E. 128 (1932).
'
1 Woodfin v. Insel, 13 Tenn. App. 493 (1931).
4-'Howard v. Amerson, 236 I1. App. 587 (1925); Borger v. McKeith, 196
Wis. 315, 224 N. W. 102 (1944) (the exigencies of justice require application of
the rule); Toranto v. Hattaway, 219 Ala. 520, 122 So. 816 (1929) (owner has
special knowledge of relation between himself and the driver); Newell v. Con-
tracting Co., 223 Ala. 109, 134 So. 870 (1931) (the rule that proof of ownership
raises presumption of owner's responsibility applies when car is found unattended
in apparent violation of traffic regulations, thereby causing injury).
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whose negligence he will be responsible, and if not true, it is fair that
he be required to explain.43  (3) That the present extensive use of the
automobile, causing commensurate injuries, has taken it beyond a neigh-
borhood affair and makes it more difficult to establish facts necessary
to recovery and compels inquiry'into the existing rule.44  (4) That the
principle advanced is the same as that permitting juries to infer, in the
absence of an explanation to the contrary, that a man found in possession
of recently stolen goods, is the personr who stole.45
Other jurisdictions have said that by the rule one having a just and
meritorious case is protected, .and no hardship is imposed upon the
owner.46  Also, it has been held that the presumption of the owner's
responsibility is based upon policy and not upon a fact inference. 47
The only arguments against adoption are outworn precedent and the
legalistic fallacy that one presumption cannot be founded upon an-
other.48  This seems to be splitting one presumption into two, rather
than basing one on another.49 It could be argued that the rule should
be limited to business or commercial vehicles,5° but it is believed that the
better reasoning is with the majority which makes no distinction.51 The
reasons for the rule extend to pleasure type vehicles.
It is suggested that North Carolina adopt the modern rule applicable
to this motor age-a rule of evidence that the plaintiff having offered
evidence tending to prove negligence of the driver and ownership of the
vehicle by the defendant be deemed to have'established a prima facie case
for the jury thereby placing the duty on the defendant of going forward
with evidence of lack of agency or lack of action within the scope of
employment,52 otherwise risking an adverse verdict. The weight of the
inference should be for the jury to determine.53
HENRY L. HARKEY.
Ahlberg v. Griggs, 158 Minn. 11, 196 N. W. 652 (1924) (it is reasonable to
presume that a person driving another's automobile on a pubic highway is doing
so rightfully as agent of owner); Laundry v. Oversen, 187 Iowa 284, 174 N. W.
255 (1919) (the rule is a mere inference that an owner is likely to be in control
of his own property) ; see Note, 42 A. L. P. 903 (1926).
"Carter v. Thurston Motor Lines, 227 N. C. 193, 199, 41 S. E. 2d 586, 590
(1947) (dissenting opinion, Seawell, J.).
Dowing v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672, 135 So. 288 (1931).
"Baker v. Maseek, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919).
Philip v. Schlager, 214 Wis. 370, 253 N. W. 394 (1934).
,STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENcE §215,. n. 43 (1946).
"See Note, 42 A. L. R. 902 (1926).
"O Double v. Myers, 305 Pa. 226, 157 Atl. 610 (1931) (limits the rule to com-
mercial vehicles, used for commercial pbrposes).
"' See Note, 96 A. L. R. 644 (1935).
"See Note, 8 Nj C. L. REv. 298 (1930) (author commenting on Jeffrey v.
Osage Mfg. Co., 197 N. C. 724, 150 S. E. 503 (1929) assumed that case to have
adopted the rule in North Carolina giving an inference of scope and suggests the
basis, a "logical core").
"' There is a split of authority whether the court may as a matter of law directa
verdict against the plaintiff when the defendant offers uncontradicted evidence that
the driver was not the owner's agent, or if he was, that he was not acting within
NOTES AND COMMENTS
International Law-International Organizations Immunities Act-
Immunity of Employees of United Nations
Defendant, a chauffeur employed by the United Nations and assigned
to drive the Secretary General of that organization, was charged with
driving at excessive speed in violation of the provisions of the ordi-
nances of the Westchester County Park Commission. The Secretary
General was in the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation. Defend-
ant contended that he was immune from prosecution because of the
provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act,1 and an
Executive Order2 issued pursuant thereto. Held: Immunity as a matter
of law is available only when it is necessary to assure the proper delibera-
tions of the international organization and defendant must plead to the
charge.3
The privileges and immunities of officers and employees of interna-
tional organizations rest on express treaty provisions, 4 or on statutes
enacted in the states in which such organizations function.5 There
appears to be no firm rule of international law which requires the grant-
ing of such privileges and immunities.
The United States has consistently taken the position that no
customary rule of international law obligates this country to grant
privileges and immunities to officers and employees of international
organizations.6 The International Organizations Immunities Act was
passed in order to implement obligations toward older international
the scope of his employment. It is submitted the better and majority rule is that
even though the rebfitting evidence is uncontradicted, the owner is not entitled to
a directed verdict when different reasonable inferences can be drawn from the facts
shown by the evidence and only' in extreme cases, where the facts are of a con-
elusive character, should the court direct a verdict. Miller v. Service and Sales,
38 P. 2d 995 (1935). Contra: Dooley v. Saunders U-Drive Co., 109 N. J. L.
295, 162 Ati. 556 (1932).
159 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U. S. C. §288 (Supp. 1946).
Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 FED. REG. 1089 (1946) designated The Food and
Agriculture Organization, The International Labor Organization, The Pan Amer-
ican Union, The United Nations, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration as entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions and immunities con-
ferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act. Exec. Order 9751, 11
Fmn. REG. 7713 (1946) added the Inter-American Coffee Board, Inter-American
Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Inter-American Statistical Institute, International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund and the
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau.
"Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (1946).
" TREATY OF BERLIN, July 13, 1878, Art. 53, provided that the European Com-
mission on the Danube should function 'in complete independence of the territorial
authority." COVENANT OF THE LEAGuE OF NATIONS, Art. 7, . 6, provided: "Repre-
sentatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League when en-
gaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities."
For discussion on this point see L. Preuss, Diplomatic Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Agents' Invested with Functions of an International Interest, 25 Am. J.
INT'L L. 694, 699 (1931).
'4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL L'.w 422423 (1942).
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organizations,7 and as declaratory of United States policy under Articles
104 and 105 of the United Nations Charter.
Analogous to the immunities of officers and employees of interna-
tional organizations are those given to diplomatic officers, which have
been held to extend to the diplomat's family, staff, and servants.8 It has
been suggested that the immunities extended to the staff and service
personnel are not necessary or desirable in the light of modern con-
ditions and that the present tendency in state practice with reference to
treatment of non-official personnel is toward a curtailment of their privi-
leges and immunities.9
Recognizing this restricted concept of the exemptions necessary to
be granted to administrative and service personnel, Congress, in passing
the Immunities Act, granted the immunity from legal process only in
relation to those acts performed by officers and employees of interna-
tional organizations in their official capacity.' 0 In this respect it is
similar to the British legislation on the same subject."
It has been said that the sole justification for, and the measure of
exemptions and immunities from the local law are to be found in the
necessity of ensuring the free working of international institutions and
the complete independence of their agents from any form of national
control.12
This standard, as it applies to officers and employees of international
organizations, is similar to that evolved by the Draft Convention on
7 CONSTITUTION OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, Art. VII,
4, Art. XV; RESOLUTIONS 32-34 of the First Session of the Council of the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Art. X; INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INTER-
NATIONAL CIViL AVIATION, Art. 1 §4; ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Art. VII; CONSTITUTION
OF THE EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, Art. XII.
' 1 STAT. 118 (1790), 22 U. S. C. §252-254 (1940). United States v. Lafontaine
(C. C. Dist. of Col. 1831) 4 Cranch 173, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15, 550 in which an
indictment charging the cook of the charg6 d'affaires of the king of Sweden
and Norway with assault and battery was quashed on motion and an affidavit of
the defense counsel. Respublica v. Delongchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (Pa. 1784). Her-
man v. Apetz, 130 Misc. Rep. 618, 224 N. Y. S. 389 (1927). See Trost v. Tomp-
kins, 44A. 2d 226, 232 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1945). Contra: Case of Gallatin's
Coachman, 1827, 4 MoORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 657. See excellent dis-
cussion in D~ak, Classification, Immunities, and Privileges of Diplomatic Agents,
1 So. CALIF. L. REV. 209, 246 (1928).
'RSEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1932), see comment Art. 23 on Diplo-
matic Privileges and Immunities. Art. 23 of the draft convention reads: "Subject
to the provisions of this Convention, a receiving state may exercise jurisdiction
over any member of the administrative or service personnel of a mission, only to
an extent and in such manner as to avoid undue interference with the conduct
of the business of the mission."
1 59 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U. S. C. §288d (Supp. 1946).
" Diplomatic Privileges (Extension) Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. VI, Ch. 44. See
39 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 163 (1945) for text of act.
"L. Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L
L. 332, 345 (1946).
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diplomatic privileges for administrative and service personnel, in that it
emphasizes the functional aspect of immunity, and allows it only when
such immunity is related to the necessity of allowing personnel of inter-
national organizations to be free of interference in the performance of
their duties.
The International Organizations Immunities Act appears to go no
further in granting immunity from legal process than is required by
the above standard.
The court in the instant case says:
"It is urged on behalf of the defendant that the application of
these cited provisions requires the exemption from prosecution or
suit, criminal or civil, and without regard to the degree of the
offense committed, of all personnel accredited to the United
Nations as an international organization, without regard to the
question as to whether the one so involved is the Secretary Gen-
eral himself or an accredited delegate to the organization's de-
liberations, or the humblest servant attached to the personnel of
the organization, and without regard to the importance or unim-
portance of the functions of the particular individual defendant
in the deliberations and workings of the organization so long as
the defendant, at the time of the commission of the offense or the
incurring of the liability, be acting in an official capacity. This
Court is not prepared to accede to that view."13
A chauffeur hired by the United Nations, assigned to drive the
Secretary General of the United Nations, and driving him at the time
of the alleged offense, would seem to be performing an official act within
the meaning of the statute. The interpretation applied by the court does
violence to the express wording of the statute14 and the intent of
Congress.15
The legal adviser to the State Department found little difficulty in
the question and answered an inquiry by Secretary General Lie saying
that the chauffeur was entitled to the immunity.16
The court distinguished the immunity of diplomatic representatives
and the immunity of officers and employees of international organiza-
Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 31, 33 (1946).14 59 STAT. 671, 7b, 22 U. S. C. §288d(b) ("Representatives of foreign govern-
ments in or to international organizations and officers and employees of such
organizations shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts per-
formed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions as such
representatives, officers, or employees except insofar as such immunity may be
waived by the foreign government or international organization concerned.").
1" See H. R. REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1" Letter from Mr. Charles Fahy, legal adviser to the Department of State,
to Secretary General Lie. N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1946, p. 1, col. 6. On the other
hand the reactions of the citizens of the United States might be noted: Judge
Rubin "displayed a thick sheaf of letters received from all parts of the country.
Each letter without exception, protested against the granting of immunity in the
Ranollo case and all similar legal action involving United Nations personnel."
N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1946, p. 21, col. 3.
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tions by saying that the diplomatic representatives, their families, staff
or servants are subject to return to their own country for trial and
punishment while officers and employees of international organizations,
if granted immunity, would escape trial and punishment completely.' t
It should not be assumed that because the United Nations has no
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenders that no effective action
can be taken by the United Nations against an employee who has vio-
lated the local law. The Secretary General has broad administrative
power and should be capable of dealing out adequate punishment.18
If this method be found unworkable, it is suggested that the United
Nations set up a tribunal to try cases of violations by officers and em-
ployees of local law, and of violations of regulations of the organization
itself. There is ample power in Article 1419 and Article 2220 of the
United Nations Charter for the General Assembly to create such a
tribunal.
That there have been and will 'be abuses of these privileges and
immunities by officers and employees of international organizations can-
not be doubted, but so necessary a rule must not be abandoned' because
of the derelictions of a few. To hold otherwise is to set a precedent
that conceivably might become an instrument of coercion toward the
international organization, its officers, or employees, by the national
state in which such organization functions.
DONALD W. McCoY.
Municipal Corporations-Taxation-Meaning of Public Purpose
"Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes" under Art. V, §3,
of the North Carolina Constitution.' Therefore, whether the project
"Westciester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S.. 2d 31, 34 (1946). (The
Court here refers to a case of "one Avenol in the Courts of the Republic of
France" as refusing to grant immunity to the Secretary General of the League of
Nations on a charge of non-support of his family. No citation is given and re-
search has failed to disclose the case.) But cf. V.- v. D -, 54 Clunt 1175(1927) (a civil case in which immunity was recognized in the case of a permanent
delegate to the League of Nations).
"U. N. CHARTm, Art. 97, Art. 101. The request for immunity was with-
drawn by the Security Officer of the United Nations by direction of Secretary
General Lie. N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1946, p. 1, col. 6.9 
"Subject to the provisions of Art. 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations,
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present
Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." U. N.
CHARTER, Art. 14.
. "'The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary for the performance of its functions." U. N. CHARTER, Art. 22.1 This sentence was put into the constitution by a 1936 amendment. However,
following the trend of judicial decisions in this country, North Carolina adopted
the doctrine that taxes may be levied only for public purposes in Wood v. Ox-
ford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S. E. 653 (1887). See McAllister, Public Purpose in Tax-
ation, 18 CpAi.n L. REv. 137 (1930) for a discussion of the history of this doctrine.
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in mind is a public purpose is one of the first hurdles that the governing
body of any municipal corporation must clear in passing on a proposed
tax levy.2
In Nash v. Town of Tarboro3 the question arose whether a munic-
ipality pursuant to an act of the Legislature4 could by an ordinance
approved and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters issue
$250,000 in bonds for the construction and operation of a commercial
hotel, the interest and principal of the bonds to be paid by levying an-
nually a sufficient amount of taxes. Held: Judgment of the superior
court denying plaintiff taxpayer's request for injunctive relief, uphold-
ing the ordinance and statute, and dismissing the action is reversed. The
construction and operation of a hotel is not a public purpose within the
meaning of Art. V, §3, of the North Carolina Constitution. Therefore
the Legislature is without authority to authorize a municipality to issue
bonds and levy taxes for this project.
"The difficulty, however, arises in deciding what is and what is not
a public purpose." 5 Since the "necessary expenses" of municipal cor-
porations, within the meaning of Art. VII, §7 of the Constitution,
necessarily involve public purposes, the items which have been held to
be necessary expenses are per se public purposes.6
The following items have been held to be such necessary expenses .
(1) the ordinary expenses of government including salaries, wages and
office expenses; (2) the building and repair of municipal buildings, pub-
lic roads, streets, bridges, market houses, jetties, abbattoirs,'cemeteries,
sewerage systems, electric light plants, water-works plants, and incin-
erators; (3) the maintenance of the poor; (4) the maintenance of the
administration of justice; (5) fire insurance for school buildings; (6)
2 Other and related constitutional hurdles, beyond the scope of this note, include:(1) Restriction of Art. V, §6 (upon state and county only) that "The total of the
State and county tax on property shall not exceed fifteen cents on the one hun-
dred dollars value of property, except when the county property tax is levied for
a special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly. . . ."
See Coates and Mitchell, Property and Poll Tax Limitations Under the North
Carolina Constitution, 18 N. C. L. REvi. 275 (1940). An amendment is to be sub-
mitted to the people in 1948 to increase this to twenty-five cents. (2) Restriction
of Art. VII; §7 that "No ... municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge
its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers
of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the
majority of the qualified voters therein." See Coates and Mitchell, Necessary
Expenses, 18 N. C. L. REv. 93 (1940). (3) Restriction of Art. V, §4 (if *any
debt is to be contracted) which limits the increage of public debts by counties
and municipalities. See Hoyt and Fordham, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Pub-
lic Debt in North Carolina, 16 N. C.*L. Rev. 329 (1938).
3 227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947).
,N. C. Session Laws 1945, c. 413.
' Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 211 (1947).
' This is recognized by the court in Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42
S. E. 2d 209, 211 (1947), where they list the items.Es Coates and Mitchell, Necessary Expenses, 18 N. C. L. REv. 93 (1940).
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professional services in refunding bonds;. (7) contract with hospital for
care of indigent sick and afflicted poor.
In addition, the following have been held to be public purposes:
(1) aid to railroads;7 (2) aid to establish a teachers training school;8
(3) railway terminal fadilities ;9 (4) public auditorium ;1o (5) World War
I Veterans' Loan Fund; (6) the state fair ;12 (7) a park;18 (8) a mu-
nicipal hospital ; :14 (9) an airport;'r (10) port terminal facilities;16 (11)
public housing authority under federal housing acts ;17 (12) playgrounds
and recreational facilities;8 (13) public library;1O and (14) schools.2
'Wood v. Town of Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S. E. 653 (1887); accord, Caldwell
v. Justices of Burke County, 57 N. C. 323 (1858). On eminent domain see
Raleigh & G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).8 Cox v. Commissioners, 146 N. C. 584, 60 S. E. 516 (1908) (Pitt County pro-
posed to issue bonds not exceeding $50,000 to aid in establishing what is now
Eastern Carolina Teachers College).9 Hudson v. Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 117 S. E. 629 (1923), 2 N. C. L. Rav.
38 (1923) (issuance of bonds amounting to $1,300,000 to lend the Southern Rail-
road the proceeds thereof to build a railway terminal in Greensboro pursuant to
N. C. Priv. L, 1920, c. 105; approved by a vote of the people).
"
0 Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C. 232, 126 S. E. 611 (1925) (city proposed to
build a public auditorium using funds derived from the sale of a city lot; not
voted on by the people).
" Hinton v. Lacy, State Treasurer, 193 N. C. 496, 137 S. E. 669 (1927) (state
issued bonds to establish a fund whereby veterans could borrow up to $3,000 to
build homes; this was approved by the voters of North Carolina in 1924 and
again in 1926).
"Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S. E. 576 (1928) (N. C. Pub. L. 1927,
c. 209, set aside 200 acres of state land for the purpose of holding a state fair pro-
vided the city of Raleigh would donate $75,000 thereto by issuing bonds in that
amount, the issuance of which was authorized by c. 110, upon approval of the
voters of Raleigh. Voters approved. Court held that a state fair was a "public
undertaking" and that its location or retention within five miles of Raleigh made
the bond issue for a "public municipal purpose.").
"
3 Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928)(issuance of bonds pursuant to N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 48, for purchase of part of
land for Smoky Mt. National Park). See note 21 infra.
" Burleson v. Board of Aldermen of Spruce Pine, 200 N. C. 30, 156 S. E. 241
(1930)'
"Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E.
2d 803 (1946); Turner v. Reidsville 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944);
Goswick v. Durham, 211 N. C. 687, 191 S. E. 728 (1937); cf. Sing v. Charlotte,
213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1937).
6Webb v. Port Commission, 205 N. C. 663, 172 S. E. 377 (1933) (Port Com-
mission was set up as a corporation to construct, maintain and operate port
facilities at Morehead City with power to issue tax exempt bonds.) ; cf. Henderson
v. Wilmington, 191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 728 (1926).
"
7 Mallard v. Eastern Carolina Housing Authority, 221 N. C. 334, 20 S. E. 2d
281 (1942); Cox v. Kinston, 217 N. C. 391, 8 S. E. 2d 252 (1941); Wells v.
Housing Authority, 213 N. C. 745, 197 S. E. 693 (1938). Also see N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) c. 157.
"
8 Atkins v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936) (Durham issued
$25,000 in bonds without a vote of the people to acquire land for" public parks
and playgrounds. Held that for a city as populous and industrial as Durham, such
objectives were necessary expenses); Twining v. Wilhington, 214 N. C. 655, 200
S. E. 416 (1939) (parks and playgrounds were not a necessary expense for Wil-
mington, although they were a public purpose); Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N. C. 691,
36 S. E. 2d 281 (1945) (donation of land by city for recreational centers is
for a public purpose) ; Pursuer v. Ledbetter, Treasurer of Charlotte, 227 N. C. 1,
40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946) (public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities are
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The North Carolina Court has utilized eminent domain as a test;
i.e., the fact that what is a public purpose for eminent domain is gen-
erally also a public purpose for which taxes may-be levied.2 1  However,
the list is not added to as most of the previously mentioned projects
have also been the subject of the eminent domain decisions32
The "custom and usage" test may work both ways.m "In determin-
ing whether or not a tax is for a public purpose, when considered in
the light of custom and usage. . . courts should also take into con-
sideration the fact, that a purpose not thereofore considered public but
by reason of changed conditions and circumstances, may be so classi-
fied."24  The court points out by analogy that prior to a 1903 decisionas
water and lights were not considered necessary expenses. Judging from
this declaration and past decisions the expected trend of any change
not a necessary expense, although a public purpose, Atkins v. Durham, supra,
will not "be followed as a precedent").
" Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939) (public library
not a necessary expense, but by implication it is a public purpose); Westbrook
v. Southern Pines, 215 N. C. 20, 1 S. E. 2d 95 (1939). See N. C. GEN. STAT.
(1943) §§160-75 and 160-77.
"Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 145 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 44
(1907). For cases on public purpose from other jurisdictions see 51 Am. Jun.§§342-386, 44 C. J. §4285, 61 C. J. §21; 5 McQunLLEN, MuxcpAL CRPoRATiONs
§§1951-1960, 2325 (rev. ed. 1937).
" Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 212 (1947)("A municipal corporation, however, in the exercise of a proprietary right, just as
in the exercise of a governmental power,. cannot invoke the power of taxation or
the right of eminent domain except for a public purpose."); Charlotte v. Heath,
226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946) (co'ndemnation case); Yarborough v.
Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928) (Plaintiff objected to
proposed bond issue on grounds that acquisition of lands for a national park with
the proceeds was* not a public purpose. Court held that the bonds were for a
public purpose on basis of eminent domain cases and authorities.). Also see
Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944); Cox v. City of
Kinston, 217 N. C. 391, 8 S. E. 2d 252 (1940); 6 McQuLLzE, MuNmcn'AL CoR-
PORATIONS §2532 (rev. ed. 1937) (". . . no good reason is apparent why a purpose,
if public as to one [i.e., eminent domain or taxation] is not public as to all.");
51 Am. JuR. §324 ("... in its practical application public use has much the same
meaning in eminent domain that it has in taxation.') ; accord, Cole v. La Grange,
113 U. S. 1 (1885); McBAn, A ERICAN Crv PROGRESS AND THE LAW, c. 5(1917); JUDsoN, TAXATION §351 (1903); McGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 229
(1906).
"2 Public ferries' might be added to the list. Willaims v. Commissioners of
Craven County, 119 N. C. 520, 26 S. E. 150 (1896) ; Barrington v. Neuse River
Ferry Co., 69 N. C. 165 (1875). For material approaching the subject from the
eminent domain angle see Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of
Eminent Domain, 20 B. U. L. Rxv. 615 (1940) ; Note, 21 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 285
(1946).
" Prior decisions have been held to be of little weight. City of Tombstone v.
Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1927) ("We should not be controlled to too
great an extent by decisions of courts in climates far distant from ours . . . [or
which] ... come from a remote time, and therefore may be out of tune with mod-
em conditions.").
." Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 212 (1947) (this
custom and usage idea was adopted from Loan & Savings Association v. Topeka,
87 U. S. 655 (1874)).
" Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 1029 (1903).
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would be towards increasing the favored objectives. However, using
the suggested necessary expense analogy one finds that in 1936 recrea-
tional facilities in industrial Durham were held to be a necessary ex-
pense26 but after chipping away at this holding T the court decided in
194628 that such facilities are not necessary expenses.
Justice Barnhill's definition of public purpose is: "It must be a cor-
porate purpose directly connected with the local government and having
for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, gen-
eral welfare, security, prosperity or contentment of the inhabitants or
residents within the political division from whence the revenue for its
support is derived."' 9 Such a statement is loaded with terms over
which reasonable men may disagree. The citizens of Tarboro, faced
with a situation where private enterprise had broken down in that the
only hotel for its 8,000 people was "obsolete" and bore a "poor repu-
tation,"30 thought a hotel would promote the "general welfare and con-
venience of both the residents and transients ... and.., the economic
interests of the town." 31 The trial judge so found. The court's answer
was "but ordinarily such benefits will be considered too incidental to
justify the expenditure of public funds."32  Thus, the presence of only
one or two of Justice Barnhill's criteria may be insufficient. Or, as
one authority states: "Hardly any project of public benefit is without
some element of peculiar personal profit to individuals, hardly any pri-
vate attempt to use the taxing power is without some colorable pretext
of public good. Each case must be judged on its own facts, and any
attempt at fixed definition must result in confusion and contradictions."83
Another test utilized in the principal case was whether the object
under scrutiny would be exempt from taxation by virtue of that part
of Art. V. §3,'N. C. Constitution which provides that "property belong-
ing to the state or to municipal corporations" must be exempt.84 This
has been construed to mean only property held for a public purpose.36
"Atldns v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936).
Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939).28Pursuer v. Ledbetter, 227 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946). See note 18
Concurring in part and dissenting in part in Greensboro-High Point Airport
Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. 2d 803 (1946).
'o Transcript of Record, p. 10, Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283,
42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947).
31 Id. at 7.
Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 290, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 214 (1947).
6 MCQUILLEN, Muracnx. CoapoRATIoNs §2532 (rev. ed. 1937).
"Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 289, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 213 (1947).
"Winston-Salem v. Forsyth County, 217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. 2d 381 (1940) ;
Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. 464 (1939); Town of
Weaverville v. Hobbs, Commissioner, 212 N. C. 684, 194 S. E. 860 (1937) ; Ben-
son v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935) ; Board of Financial
Control v. Heiderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E. 636 (1935). For a
thorough discussion of these cases see Coates, The Battle of Exemptionw, 19 N. C.
L. RzV. 154 (1941).
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But this argument goes in a circle. Thus, Warrenton v. Warren
County 8 decided that a hotel acquired by a town to protect an invest-
ment was taxable by the county because the hotel was not held for a
public purpose.
In cases of this type, it is probable that public policy as the court
sees it is often the factor that tips the scales one way or the other. The
court in the instant case quotes from two cases that take the traditional
viewpoint. The first is an 1874 decision3 7 of the United States Supreme
Court to the effect that a city bond issue to donate money to a private
iron works was not a public purpose.3 s The second is an 1887 Ken-
tucky case3 9 in which it was said: "Certainly, a tax could not be con-
stitutionally levied to aid one in building or conducting a hotel; and to
exempt the keeper from the payment of the tax thereon is but doing
indirectly what cannot be done directly."
Although the question in the principal case was not whether Tar-
boro could give public money to a private corporation to build a hotel,
but whether Tarboro could erect and operate its own hotel, the under-
lying question of public policy is analogous. However, the United
States Supreme Court has, without overruling the 1874 case, taken a
broader view in a 1920 decision4" allowing the State of North Dakota
to set up state enterprises to manufacture and market farm products,
to provide homes for residents, and to establish a state bank and in a
1927 decision41 upholding the right of the City of Lincoln, Nebraska,
to establish a municipal filling station which operated at cost. The more
recent state decisions "indicate a tendency to ... broaden the scope of
those activities involving a public purpose in which a state or its political
subdivisions may lawfully engage."4
Nor is the enactment of the legislature authorizing the project suffi-
cient in North Carolina. "In. its final analysis, it is a question for the
courts." 43 The United States Supreme Court has in recent years devel-
a6215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. 2d 464 (1939).
s Savings & Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655 (1874).
3 See McAllister, supra note 1 for discussion of this case.
"Lancaster v. Clayton, 86 Ky. 373. 5 S. W. 864 (1887).
,0 253 U. S. 233 (1920) Note 29 YALE L. J. 933 (1920).
'
1 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 962, aff'd
w .in, 275 U. S. 504 (1927), Note 41 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1928).
See Note, 115 A. L. R. 1459 (1938).
Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 286, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 211 (1947)
(court cites this phrase from Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S. E. 597(1928)). Similar language is used in many other cases. Turner v. Reidsville,
224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944); Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N. C.
745, 197 S. E. 693 (1938); Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145
S. E. 563 (1928) ; Hinton v. Lacy, State Treasurer, 193 N. C. 496, 137 S. E. 669
(1927) ; Stratford v. Greensboro, 124,N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394 (1899). But cf.
Hudson v. Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 516, 117 S. E. 629, 636 (1923) ("It was
earnestly argued before us that the proposition that . . .Greensboro should loan
this fund would impair its credit, that the issue of over a million dollars in bonds
by a city for the purposes recited [to loan to Southern Railroad to build a terminal
1947]
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oped a broader view, stating: "When Congress has spoken on this sub-
ject [what is a public purpose] its decision is entitled to deference until
it is shown to involve an impossibility. Any departure from this judicial
restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and what is not a
governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis
of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice
which has proved impracticable in other fields.""14
NoEL R. S. WOODHOUSE.
Negotiable Instruments-Adoption of Printed Seal
Suit was brought on a "note or bond" set out in detail in the com-
plaint with the usual allegations of demand and non-payment.1 The
copy of the note disclosed the printed word "Seal" at the right of de-
fendant maker's signature but there was no recital such as "Witness
my hand and seal." 2 The answer admitted execution of the instrument
set out in the complaint and pleaded the statute of limitations, "Said notes
not bearing the seal of ... defendants and were more than three years
past due prior to the bringing of this action."3 The trial judge excluded
defendant's evidence that he neither sealed the note nor understood the
significance of nor adopted the printed word as his seal.4 He also de-
clined to submit any issue on the question of defendant's intent to adopt
the word as his seal.5 Moreover in his charge to the jury the judge
referred to the instrument as a bond.6
Thus hedged in and his instrument judicially classified against him,
the defendant lost at trial and on appeal claimed the rulings and charge
of the trial judge to have been error. That, if erroneous, they had been
prejudicial could not be doubted.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in affirming said that after
defendant had admitted. executing the instruments set out by plaintiff it
would violate the parol evidence rule to admit evidence that they were
in city] was not only novel . . . and that the precedent thus set, if followed to any
extent, would not serve the public interest. But these are nwt matters which are
confided to this branch of the government.").
" United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546
(1946) (case related to taking of land in Swain County, N. C., by the T. V. A.).
But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed.
IBell v. Chadwick, N. C. Super. Ct., May term, Craven County, 1946.
2Id. Fall term, 1946, North Carolina Supreme Court, record on appeal, p. 3.
It seems to be settled that the recital when present will conclusively establish the
adoption of the printed word Seal. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209
N. C. 174, 176, 183 S. E. 606, 607 (1936), semble. Cf. Churchill v. Speight's
Extrs., 3 N. C. 338 (1805).
'Record, pp. 7, 8. As to the .necessity of pleading the facts see Murray v.
Barden, 132 N. C. 136, 43 S. E. 600 (1903) and other cases in N. C. DIGEST,






not sealed instruments: "The allegation and admission establish the
word 'Seal' as a part of each instrument."7
To one who has in mind what we were told in Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co. v. Morehead,8 i.e., that "The [parol evidence] rule
... is not violated... by showing that an instrument apparently under
seal is a simple contract," the first thought is that defendant slipped up
in his pleading; he should have denied that he executed a sealed instru-
ment as alleged and then added his specific plea of non-adoption and
the statute of limitations. Nothing can be learned, of course, from the
Morehead case as to correct defense pleading to avoid the parol evi-
dence pitfall since the judicial pronouncement there was dictum and no
such state of facts was involved.
But in Williams v. Turner,9 the case which first in recent years
brought this question into prominence, the trial judge's seventh finding
of fact recited that defendant admitted the execution of a note identical
in all material respects with that in the instant case and yet he was per-
mitted to assert his non-adoption of the printed word and to win on
the short statute of limitations. And in Currin v. Currin the court said,
"The defendant admitted the execution, which admission carries with it
amongst other things, the burden of showing that he had not adopted
the seal."' 0 No doubt the defendant in the principal case would assert
that this was exactly what he was trying to do, i.e., carry the burden
with the evidence he wanted to introduce after he had admitted the
execution but that the trial judge would not let him do it. If the
Supreme Court here had been so inclined they could have treated his
answer as sufficient denial of the execution of a sealed instrument to
have permitted him to testify as to non-adoption of the printed seal -if
non-adoption could serve him as a valid defense. Considering that
defendant admitted the execution of the instrument set out but followed
it in another paragraph by a denial that he comprehended or adopted the
seal, the plaintiff was certainly on sufficient notice that defendant was
not intending to admit that the instrument he signed was a sealed instru-
ment. Obviously he only intended admitting that he put his name to the
form set out; and the legal status of that form as a sealed instrument
depended on his intent-or so we were given to understand from the
earlier decisions.
The truth of the matter seems to be that since the Morehead dictum
we have been inchting along toward a new rule, counsel never having
put their cases in such shape or the facts not being such as to force a
square decision. Thus in one case' after the defendant had "admitted
"Bell v. Chadwick, 226 N. C. 598, 39 S. E. 2d 743 (1946).
'209 N. C. 174, 183 S. E. 606 (1936), Note, 14 N. C. L. REv. 311 (1936).
'208 N. C. 202, 179 S. E. 806 (1935), Note, 14 N. C. L. REv. 80 (1935).
"0 219 N. C. 815, 817, 15 S. E. 2d 279, 281 (1941).
"' Allsbrook v. Walton, 212 N. C. 225, 193 S. E. 151 (1937).
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execution of the note, pleaded that it was not under seal and interposed
by way of defense the three-year statute of limitations," and plaintiff
had offered the note with its printed seal in evidence, defendant de-
murred to the evidence although he had been told by the Morehead dictum
that he must take up the burden of proving non-adoption. He lost.1 2
In another case wherein defendant admitted execution of the note13
and then to sustain the burden of proving non-adoption, testified to
nothing more than that he could not remember what he had intended,
such "negative testimony" got him nowhere.
In a still later case14 where defendant desired to introduce evidence
of his intent not to.adopt the printed word "Seal," counsel had failed
to plead its non-adoption and so had failed to put the issue into the
case. "The absence of allegata is as fatal as the absence of probata."'5
Other recent cases16 of notes bearing "Seals" fall equally short of
putting squarely to the court the ultimate issue, which may be stated
in two ways: (1) As a matter of substantive law, does an intent, dis-
closed or undisclosed, not to adopt the printed word "Seal" leave the
instrument legally a simple contract; (2) if the defendant so pleads as
1 'Correspondingly in Lee v. Chamblee, 223 N. C. 146, 25 S. E. 2d 433
(1943), where the trial judge nonsuited a plaintiff under the three-year statute
(R. p. 6) after the note bearing the printed seal had been introduced, the judg-
ment was reversed and a new trial granted. In that case defendant's pleading did
not exactly admit the execution of the note. He said that after its execution by
his co-maker he "signed said note as accommodation surety," adding a specific
denial of an intent to adopt the printed word "Seal" and a plea of the statute
(R. pp. 4-5).
" Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 816, 15 S. E. 2d 279, 281 (1941). Here
he admitted execution of the note at trial rather than in his pleadings. His testi-
mony was only, "I can't say that I intended to show 'Seal"' and "I couldn't say
right now that I remember seeing the word 'seal.'" This presented no question for
the jury.
Roberts v. Grogan, 222 N. C. 30, 21 S. E. 2d 829 (1942).
' He did plead the bar of the three-year statute of limitations which would be
meaningless if he admitted that the instrument was sealed and so if the court had
been disposed to help the defendant it could have treated the plea as fairly raising
the issue of adoption and permitting relevant testimony. Obviously here, as in the
principal case, the court did not want to come to defendant's aid and force itself
to meet the issue discussed herein.
"cIn neither Hertford Banking Co. v. Stokes, 224 N. C. 83, 29 S. E. 2d 24
(1944) nor Perry v. First Citizens' Bk. & Tr. Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E. 2d
116 (1946) was any point made of the adoption of the word "Seal" and in neither
is it certain that the word was printed. In the latter each note by its own terms
was described both as "note" and "bond." Record, pp. 35-36. In both cases the
respective notes were treated as sealed instruments. The Hertford case went off
on the ground that an indorsement, even if sealed, takes the short statute. It
might perhaps.also have been disposed of on the common law ground that persons
not appearing in sealed and negotiable instruments cannot be charged as parties
thereto. See 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (1914) §§1734-1736; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY,§§151, 152, 186. The Perry case went on the ground that conditional delivery can
be used as a defense (between the parties) to even a sealed note. It does not,
however, sharply distinguish between oral conditions precedent and subsequent, i.e.,
between oral conditions to becoming obligated and to a duty to pay. The case
also further fortifies the view that, though a seal on a note "imports" a considera-
tion, failure of consideration is a defense (between the parties).
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to avoid admitting the execution of a sealed instrument, is he then
entitled to offer evidence of an intent, disclosed or undisclosed, not to
adopt the printed word as his seal and have the matter passed on by the
jury with a proper instruction. Whichever way the matter is presented
it should receive the same answer. Notwithstanding the pretty strong
past indications to the contrary, I venture to predict that the answer
will be no, at least as to any secret, undisclosed intent. And even as to
a disclosed intent (e.g., maker to payee: "I don't intend this to be a
sealed instrument, you understand." Payee says nothing.) it seems that
the answer should be the same unless defendant's silence in the face of
such statments would be regarded as ground for reformation.' 7
A brief running survey -of the situation then may be helpful partic-
ularly with reference to matters of pleading and proof.
If a plaintiff alleged that the defendant executed a promissory note
to a named payee but said nothing about a seal, he might in some juris-
dictions and in days gone by, have been guilty of a variance when later
he offered in evidence, not a simple promissory note but a sealed instru-
ment-a bill single.' 8  Absent actual prejudice to the defendant from
this technical variance, no such consequence would have befallen the
plaintiff holder in North Carolina, even before the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.' 9 Yet even here a plaintiff out of caution now and then
recites that the defendant executed his promissory note "or bond."
20
There was once the possibility also that a complaint on a more than
three years overdue simple note would be met by a demurrer on the
ground that the staleness appeared on the face of the complaint. 2' But
that risk no longer faces the plaintiff in North Carolina as the defense of
the statute must be "taken by answer."
22
" This might be predicated either on a mutual mistake of law or on some sort
of fraud by the payee on the maker, matters sufficient for an independent study.
Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N. C.
L. REv. 169 at footnotes 60, 63 (1931). See generally, 5 Wn.LlsroN, CoNTRAcTs§§1549, 1581-1586, 1525 (1937). The case for the maker would seem to be
stronger if the printed insignia was "(L. S.)." Mistake of fact, see Malone,
Reformnation of Writings for Mutual Mistake of Fact, 24 GEo. L. J. 613 (1936),
seems .to be out of the question.
28 Reed v. Scott, 30 Ala. 640 (1857) (but amendment was permitted).
"9 Lily v. Baker, 88 N. C. 151 (1883).
'
0 Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941), complaint, par. 2.
2 Sturges v. Burton, 8 Oh. St. 215, 220, 72 Am. Dec. 582 (1858). Cf. Hosterman
v. First Nat. Bk. & Tr. Co. of Springfield, - Oh. App. -, 68 N. E. 2d 325(1946); Roy N. DeVault v. Harry S. Truman and another, - Mo. - , 194
S. W. 2d 29, 32 (1946), motion to -dismiss, Pendergast & Kohn for defendant
Truman; Robinson v. Lewis, 45 N. C. 58, 60 (1852), where in equity not even a
demurrer was required and the defense was permitted on hearing. (These are not
promissory note cases.)
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-15 and annotitions; N. C. DIGEST, Limitation
of Actions, §§180, 182(3); Note, 14 N. C. L. Rav. 396 (1936). Similarly else-
where as to motion to dismiss. Woolery v. Smith, 302 Ky. 725, 196 S. W. 2d
115 (1946). Cf. where used by plaintiff against a set-off. Stanly's Extr. v. Green,
1 N. C. 66 (1795). But note Editor's Quaere, 1901 Reprint.
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The problems just discussed, however, are largely academic today
because of the more or less standardized practice 23 of setting out the
note ipsissirnis verbis, thus disclosing the presence of the word "Seal"
after the maker's signature. That is. certainly sufficient for all purposes
and as just noted the defendant must plead the bar of the statute. But
the defendant is advised by the instant case that he had better not in
his answer admit execution of the note thus set forth in the complaint.
Perhaps he should deny the allegations of that paragraph of the com-
plaint "except that he admits that he placed his signature on the printed
form set out in said paragraph of the complaint without adopting but, to
the contrary, with the intent not to adopt as his seal the word 'Seal'
printed thereon but with the intention of executing a simple unsealed
promissory note." To this he might also add, though it would seem to
be a conclusion of law, the allegation that the instrument is not the
sealed promise of the defendant. He would then plead the three-year
statute of limitations.
There seems to be no requirement under our practice that the plain-
tiff reply.24 The cause is then at issue.
At trial, plaintiff would offer the note, prove defendant's signature
(or rely on the admission if, as here assumed, there was one) and any
indorsements necessary to his title.2 5 If the burden of proof consistently
followed the burden of pleading it would now be on defendant to prove
the fact that the statute had run. The burden of proof, however, is other-
wise in North Carolina.26 For rather obvious reasons the plaintiff must
put in evidence and convince the jury that the claim is not barred, as,
e.g., that there was a later promise by defendant which tolled the statute.
Where, however, the question of whether the debt is barred depends not
" See N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-156; 1 DOUGLAS, FORMS (1941), no. 378;
ILL. Civ. PRAc. AcT, Ann. Bar Ass'n Ed. (1933) Apdx. I, 24, no. 19; I WiNsLow,
FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed., 1915), 555, no. 884. Or by adding it
as an exhibit. PEL's FORMS (1912), no. 187; CONN. PRAcTIcE BOOK (1934) 148,
no. 73. Cf. GREGORY'S COMMON LAw FORMS (1927) 34, no. 27; WHITTELSEY,
MIssoURI PRACTICE (1876) 260, no. 44. Nearly all the cases commented on herein
set out the notes in full. Even that style of complaint, however, would not always
show that the word "Seal" was printed as part of a form.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-141; Oldham v. Rieger, 145 N. C. 254, 148 S. E.
548 (1907). Notwithstanding that rule, one case said there may be judgment of
nonsuit on the pleadings where "the statute of limitations having been properly
pleaded it appears from the face of the complaint and the uncontroverted evidence
that'the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by statutory limitation of time." This
sounds as if it denied plaintiffs a hearing on the facts but the court was probably
satisfied from the record that. plaintiffs had nothing more relevant to offer than
something Uncle Samuel had told them. Latham v. Latham, 184 N. C. 55, 113
S. E. 623 (1922). Followed in Jones v. Bankers Life Co., 131 F. 2d 989, 994
(C. C. A. 4th 1942).
" In case of indorsements plaintiff might be a holder in due course in which case
certainly no defense of non-adoption of the word "Seal" should be available.
2 "Incumbent on plaintiff to show." Powers v. Planters Nat. Bk., 219 N. C.
254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941). Contra by rule of court. In rc McKeyes Est., 315
Mich. 369, 24 N. W. 2d 155 (1946).
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on such extraneous matter but on a matter appearing on the face of the
instrument, i.e., the word "Seal" and the intent of the defendant regard-
ing it, the plaintiff has already done enough and the defendant has now
the burden of showing non-adoption.2 7  This it would seem he might
do by showing that he had made marks through the word "Seal. '28
Perhaps he could do it by testimony that when he signed he said to the
payee, "I do not intend this print to be a seal."2 9 From past decisions
we would understand that he could do it also by testimony that, "I then
intended not to adopt the printed word, though I said nothing about my
intent one way or the other," it being for the jury whether to believe
him or not.
The present case does not squarely tell us that such negative intent
is immaterial or that testimony concerning it is inadmissible if the
defendant has not admitted execution of the instrument. If a future
case does tell us those things it will have scrapped a good deal of what
has been said and implied in the past, for it is idle to talk of defendant's
having a burden of proving what he will not be permitted to prove. It
may be that the line will be drawn between offers to prove disclosed
and those to prove undisclosed intent, though it is not easy to see why
the one violates the parol evidence rule more than the other.80  The
rule we have come to or near to is better than the one we had or seemed
to have. A carefully piloted test case is awaited.
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE.
27 Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941). Evidently the
burden of convincing the jury not just the burden of going forward. If "Execu-
tion" had meant the same thing in this case as it does in the principal case the court
would never have reached this point. See text at note 10 supra.
2 Though those very marks would be sufficient under present day conditions
to constitute the maker's seal if the jury believe they were put there with that
intent-an unlikely thing when put over the printed word "Seal" but. less unlikely
if the printed matter was "(L. S.)," at least to one who knew exactly what is
meant by that insignia. See 14 N. C. L. -REv. 80, 83, 87, footnotes 12, 31 (1935).
" Here, too, this might be thought more convincing when the print in question
was "(L. S.)."
"0 See I RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §98(1) (1932), and same with Van Hecke,
N. C. Annotations, 13 N. C. L. REv. 1, 67, §98(1) (1934) : "A promisor who de-
livers a written promise to which a seal has been previously affixed or impressed
with apparent reference to his signature, thereby adopts the seal. Comment:
(a) ". . . extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Quoted and followed in Federal
Res. Bk. of Richmond v. Kalin, 81 F. 2d 1003, 1007 (C. C. A. 4th 1936), in-
volving North Carolina instrument. That was before Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64 (1938). While there would seem little room for arguing in the face
of present day practice that the printed word "Seal" was not a seal within the
meaning of this section it would be less clear if the insignia were only "(L. S.)."
See 14 N. C. L. REv. 80, 87 (1935).
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Personal Property-Estates for Years-Nature of Interest
of Lessee of Estate for Years
In a recent North Carolina case1 the plaintiff contended the defend-
ant's written lease for five years, renewable for an additional term of
five years, was void for want of a seal. Held: An estate for years is
personal property,2 and therefore a lease is not required to be under
seal.3
The authorities are in conflict as to whether a lease is a contract,4 a
conveyance, 5 or a conveyance with contractual obligations superimposed.6
This note does not discuss the nature of the instrument creating an estate
for years. The treatment is focused on the question of whether an
estate for years is real or personal property.
At early common law, an estate for years, although an interest in
land,7 was termed personal property because the ousted lessee could only
bring a personal action9 in which he might be compelled to accept dam-
ages in lieu of specific restitution of the land. However, as early as the
fifteenth century, upon a judgment to recover the term by a writ
ejectione firmae, the sheriff executed the writ of possession by deliver-
ing possession to the lessee.10 This procedure was so effective that free-
holders abandoned the hallowed but highly technical real actions and
employed the fictions of John Doe and Richard Roe in order to avail
themselves of the action of ejectment. 1 Nevertheless, the estate for
years has continued through the centuries to be classified as personal
property, except as modified by statute.12
' Moche v. Leno, 227 N. C. 159, 41 S. E. 2d 369 (1947).
2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §8 (1936). Interest in lands less than freehold,
such as estates for years, are grouped under the generic name of personal property.
These interests .are merely defined and not treated by the RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY.
'Mayberry v. Johnson, 15 N. J. L. 116 (1835); accord, Stephens v. Midyette,
161 N. C. 323, 77 S. E, 243 (1913). But see Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N. C.
511, 513, 29 S. E. 773 (1898) (". . . a seal has been absolutely indispensable to
the validity of deeds in which is conveyed a greater estate than a three year
lease.").
'See Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272, 275 (1858) (Pearson, J.:. "A lease for
years is a contract, by-which one agrees for valuable consideration, called rent, to
let another have occupation and profits of the land for a definite time.") ; 2 BL.
Comm. *140 ("An estate for years is a contract for the possession of lands or
tenements, for some determinate period.").
'2 BL. Comm. *317 ("A lease is properly a conveyance of any lands or tene-
ments, usually in consideration of rent or other annual recompense....").
"THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §1100 (1940); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT §16 (1910) ; 35 C. J. 1139; 32 Am. Ju. §2.
" BL. CoMMi. *317.
'See Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 565, 4 S. W. 56, 59 (1887) ("No proposi-
tion has been better settled from. the earliest days of common law than that a
lease, of whatever duration, is but a chattel.").
'I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §3 (3d ed. 1939).
" 3 BL. Comm. *200. "1 Ibid.
"See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 185, 221 N. W. 111,
112 (1928) ; Waddell v. United Cigar Stores of America, 195 N. C. 434, 438, 142
S. E. 585, 588 (1928) ; State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 630,
81 P. 2d 116, 128 (1938).
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,An estate for years is a chattel real. Its want of the quality of inde-
terminate duration precludes its being real property and constitutes it a
chattel. Its quality of immobility causes it to be denominated real.13
Such a hybrid chameleon may be expected to change its color with the
purposes against which it is scrutinized. Most commonly, leaseholds go
to the administrator as assets rather than descend to the heirs.14 On
the other hand, estates for years have been treated as real property and
governed by the law thereof for the purposes of conveyancing,1 5 regis-
tration and recording,'8 Statute of Frauds,'1 taxation,' 8 sale upon execu-
tion,1 9 venue,2 0 eminent domain,21 mortgages,22 and prohibiting corpora-
tions ot acquire and hold real estate.23
The courts' difficulties arise from construing or interpreting the term
"real property" to determine if it embraces estates for years. No diffi-
culty is encountered where a particular statute, such as a Statute of
Frauds, or a recording act, governs the purpose and spells out whether
or not it embraces leases or chattels real. However, utmost vigilance
2 Br. Comm. *386.1
,Fowler v. Laughlin, 183 Md. 48, 36 A. 2d 671 (1944) ; Orchard v. Wright-
Dalton-Bell,Anchor Store Co., 225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486, 20 Ann. Cas. 1072
(1910). 2 BL. Comm. *143 ("... an estate for a thousand years is only a chattel,
and reckoned as part of the personal estate."). Contra: Broadwell v. Banks, 134
Fed. 470 (C. C. D. Mo. 1905) (Ohio statute of descents controlled); McKee v.
Howe, 17 Colo. 538. 31 Pac. 115 (1892).
"' People ex rel. Healy v. Shedd, 241 Ill. 155, 89 N. E. 332 (1909); Robertson
v. Scott, 141 Tex. 374, 172 S. W. 2d 478 (1943). Contra: De Kyne v. Lewis,
4 N. J. Misc. Rep. 948, 139 AtI. 434 (1927) (Assignment of 99 year lease by wife
was not a conveyance of real property requiring a seal and assent of the husband.);
Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917) (Cardozo,
J., distinguished between a conveyance of real property and a conveyance of inter-
ests in real property.).
"
8Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 -(1928).
Statutes usually control; see WASH. REv. STAT. (1931) §10550. Contra: Hollen-
beck v. McDonald, 112 Mass. 247 (1873) (999 year lease of spring with easement
to enter and repair aqueduct held valid against bona fide purchaser without notice.
Overruled by a subsequent statute.); State Trust Co. v. Casino Co., 46 N. Y.
Supp. 492 (1897) (Mortgage on lease invalid against creditors because it was
not refiled annually as the statute required for chattel mortgages.).
" Palochucola Club v. Withington, 159 S. C. 446, 157 S. E. 621 (1931). Contra:
Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 A. L. R. 822 (1935) (oral
agreement for brokers' commissions) ; Myers v. Arthur, 135 Wash. 587, 238 Pac.
899 (1925).
"s Moulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922) (profit from the
assignment of a 5 year lease not income from sale of intangible personal property) ;
Chicago v. University of Ghicago, 302 Ill. 455, 134 N. E. 723, 23 A. L. R. 244(1922). Contra: Eidman v. Baldwin, 206 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 2d 1913) (An estate
for years is personalty for purposes of inheritance tax.); Greene Line Terminal
Co. v. Martin, 122 W. Va. 483, 10 S. E. 2d 901 (1940).
" Hyatt v. Vincennes Bank, 113 U. S. 408 (1884) (Indiana statute setting up
procedure for sale of real property upon execution expressly embraced chattels
real.).
"0 Gibson v. Logino, 111 Fla. 533, 149 So. 592 (1933).
" Mason v. City of Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S. W. 1074 (1927); see
Leopard v. Autocar Sales and Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. 2d 477 (1945).
"' Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne Co., 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 (1928).
"People ex rel. Healy v. Shedd, 241 Ill. 155, 89 N. E. 332 (1909) ; State Sav-
ings and Loan Association v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 81 P. 2d 116 (1938).
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must be exercised to determine if some specific statute exists which gov-
erns estates for years for the purpose in question.
Some courts give a broad construction or interpretation correspond-
ing to the layman's conception that real estate includes leases.24 Others
give a strict construction or interpretation and adhere to the technical
definition 25 where possible, for any related statutes are in derogation of
common law. The strictness of a court's construction or interpretation
for a particular purpose varies with the general statutory definition of
"real property" found in the construction statute, even though the court
may not have: mentioned the construction statute.
A construction statute is generally one of two types. The Missouri
statute28 is an example of the type which calls for strict construction or
interpretation. It defines "real property" to be "coextensive with lands,
tenements and hereditaments."2 7 At common law, "lands, tenements
and hereditaments" embraced only estates of freehold.2 8 In Orchard v.
Wright-Dalton-Bell Anchor Store Co., the testator had devised his
"real estate," but the administrator c. t. a. took over and sold a twenty-
year lease of the testator as personal property. Three related statutes
expressly prescribed that for the particular purposes of conveyancing,
dower, and sales upon execution certain leaseholds were to be treated
as real estate. The Missouri court painstakingly showed that the par-
ticular statutes neither applied to the circumstances involved nor gen-
erally converted common law personal property into real estate. The
sale was held valid.
In the other type of statute, such as found in Colorado, the general
definition of "real property" includes "lands, tenements, and heredita-
ments, and all rights thereto and interests therein."2 0 Estates for years
2 4Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne Co., 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 111 (1928);
State Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Bryant, 159 Ore. 601, 81 P. 2d 116 (1938).
"See Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 159, 64 Am. Dec. 538, 543
(1855) ("The legislature was dealing with terms of art and is presumed to have
used them in their technical sense.") ; Foster v. Perry, 77 N. C. 160 (1877)
(". . . it is reasonable to give such a term [real estate] the meaning which it
ordinarily bears among professional men speaking on legal subjects. . . . The
words 'real estate' in this clause of the Constitution mean freehold estate.").
" Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1942) §655.
" Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1942) §655; ARRK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §13261;
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1933) §2-4701(8); N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §1: 1-2;
N. Y. GENERAL CoNsTRucTIoN LAW §40; see also N. Y. PROPERTY LAW §33
(". . . estates for years are chattels real.") ; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3(6) ;
cf. Ky. R v. STAT. (Cullen, 1942) §446.010(13) (Land or real estate "includes
lands, tenements, and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein,
other than chattel interests.").
" See The Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 159, 64 Am. Dec. 538,
543 (1855).
Z 225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486, 20 Ann. Cas. 1072 (1910).
"CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 159, §2(5) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1944) c. 4, §7,
Moulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922) (the terms of the statute
are broad enough to comprehend leaseholds); MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson,
1936) §2.212; TENN. ANN. CODE (Williams, 1934) §15, Kelley v. Shulz, 59 Tenn.
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have always been considered interests or estates in land.3 1 Therefore,
in McKee v. Howe,3 2 the Colorado court relied on the above statute
wherein real property is defined to include all interests in land, and held
that an estate for years was real property which descended to the heirs
at law.
North Carolina's construction statute33 is similar to that of Missouri.
It defines "real property" to be "coextensive with lands, tenements and
hereditaments." As a corollary, "personal property" is defined to include
"moneys, goods, chattels, choses in action and evidences of debt, includ-
ing all things capable of ownership, not descendible to the heirs at law."
Thus the test for personal property is whether it is descendible to the
heirs at law. By implication the North Carolina court has held that
leaseholds of the decedent come into the hands of the administrator as
assets rather than descend to the heirs.34 In a dictum Pearson, J.,
said: "A term for years is a chattel real, constitutes a part of the per-
sonal estate, passes by succession to the executor or administrator, and
is assets for the payment of debts."3 5  Leaseholds have been treated as
personal property for purposes of levy and execution,3 6 registration, 7
and jurisdiction. 8 In one peculiar situation, the court construed "real
estate" in a statute to mean leaseholds.3 9
Where specific statutes for various purposes, such as the Statute of
Frauds,40 registration,41 etc., require estates for years to be treated in
218 (1873) (the Code changed the character of a leasehold, making itrealty). But cf.
Ky. REv. STAT. (Cullen. 1942) §446.010(13) (land or real estate "includes lands,
tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein, other than
chattel interests").
312 BL. Comm. *317. Moulton v. Long, 243 Mass. 129, 137 N. E. 297 (1922)
(alternative holding); Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272 (1858); Mason v. City of
Nashville, 155 Tenn. 256, 291 S. W. 1074 (1927) (lease to upper story of building
vested interest in real estate). RESTATEMENT, PaonEnrT §9 (1936). See Dabney
v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P. 2d 962, 103 A. L. R. 822 (1935) ; Fifth Ave. Bldg.
Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917).
" 17 Colo. 538, 31 Pac. 115 (1892). " N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §12-3.
" Reeves v. McMillan, 101 N. C. 479, 7 S. E. 906 (1888) ; Lee v. Lee, 74 N. C.
70 (1876).
" Glenn v. Peters, 44 N. C. 457 (1853); see also Pate v. Oliver, 104 N. C. 458,
463, 10 S. E. 709, 711 (1889) ; Foster v. Perry, 77 N. C. 160, 162 (1877).
"' Glenn v. Peters, 44 N. C. 457 (1853) (overruled by N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)§1-315; see also McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 841).
"
T Burnett v. Thompson, 35 N. C. 379 (1852) (Held that a lease of 113 years
did not have to be registered. Pearson, J., recommended legislative action) ; Wall
v. Hinson, 23 N. C. 276 (1840). Cf. Holdebrand Machinery Co. v. Post, 204 N. C.
744, 169 S. E. 629 (1933). Contra: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §43-48 (all leases
for more than 3 years shall be recorded).
"Shuford v. Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank, 207 N. C. 428, 177 S. E. 408
(1934) (Court of justice of peace has exclusive original jurisdiction in action of
summary ejectment.).
" Lee v. Lee, 74 N. C. 70 (1876) (Statute authorized administrator to collect
the rents of "real estate." It was held that "real estate" mean "leaseholds" of the
decedent, for real property in general would not come into the administrator's
bands.).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §22-2. "N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §43-38.
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a similar manner with freehold estates, the legislature has generally
explicitly specified that certain leases are covered by that statute.42 This
practice avoids the confusion resulting where the legislature redefines
"real property" for various purposes.4 3
That an estate vests in the lessee after actual entry is not ques-
tioned.44 However, some doubt remains as to the nature of the lessee's
interest prior to actual entry. Although Justice Pearson held45 that the
Statute of Uses obviated the doctrine of interessi termin, 46 subsequent
courts have discussed the doctrine of interessi termini without mention-
ing the effect of the Statute of Uses.47  Thus the doctrine of interessi
termini may still exist in North Carolina.48
An estate for years was classified as personal property at common
law; North Carolina's construction statute encourages strict construction
of specific statutes subjecting estates for years to the law of real prop-
erty; specific. statutes have been well-drafted and clearly state if leases
are to be governed by them; the doctrine of interessi termini may still be
hanging over the court; all these factors support the court's conclusion
in the principal case that estates for years are personal property.
HENRY E. COLTON.
Real Property-Spite Fences
B built a "spite fence"1 on his own property, within one and one-half
inches of the windows of the house of A, adjoining landowner, effectively
cutting off light and air therefrom, whereupon A secured an injunction
ordering removal, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on appeal,
reversed. The court held that malicious motive did not render a lawful
use of property unlawful, that motive in such use was immaterial.2
The authorities are agreed that where the motive in erection of the
"'Example: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §22-2 (". . . and all other leases . . .
exceeding in duration three'years from the making thereof... ."). But cf. N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-76.
"'Example: WASH. REV. STAT. (1931) §2303 (As used in criminal code "real
property" includes every estate, interest and right in lands, tenements and
hereditaments.").
"Williams v. Randolph & C. Ry., 182 N. C. 267, 108 S. E. 915 (1921) (assign-
ment distinguished from lease in that a lease creates an estate in land) ; Moring
v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272 (1858); 2 BL. Comm. *144.
'Moring v. Ward, 50 N. C. 272, 275 (1858).
462 BL. Comm. *339.
"See Bunch v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co., 134 N. C. 116, 118, 46 S. E. 24, 25(1903) ; State v. Boyce, 109 N. C. 739, 748, 14 S. E. 98, 100 (1891) (concurring
opinion); Barneycastle v. Walker, 92 N..C. 198 (1885).
"'1 MoaREcAfs LAW LcTuREs 531 (Dean Mordecai said: "I will back up
Judge Pearson against the field.").
'For definitions of the term "spite fence," see Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala.
381, 385, 58 So. 283, 285, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 129, 131 (1912) ; Burris v. Creech,
220 N. C. 302, 304, 17 S. E. 2d 123, 124 (1941) ; 39 WoRDs AND PHRASES (perm.
ed.) 816.
'Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A. 2d 348 (Pa. 1947).
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structure was primarily beneficial or for a useful purpose of the land-
owner, and only incidentally malicious, the injury to the adjoining land-
owner is damnum absque injuria.3  Business competition,4 securing
privacy to premises, 5 building fence to serve as boundary line fence,6
deadening of incoming noises,7 and even moving of dilapidated dwelling
onto vacant lot in such position as to obstruct light and air s have been
held to constitute dominant motives of beneficial use.-
The question before the court in the principal case was what if the
landowner's motive in erecting the structure was not beneficial but
malicious?
This court answered that motive was immaterial. There is much
authority in support of its view.9 This is based on the common law
theory of absolute ownership of land and is derived from the proposition
that, to prevent the acquisition of a negative easement of light and air
over property, the owner of such property, of necessity, must obstruct
the passage of light- and air. In protection of his property in this
manner, his motive, even if purely malicious, is of no consequence.' 0
The explanation of the common law view is aptly put by Dean
Pound:
"To the nineteenth century way of thinking the question was
simply one of the right of the owner and of the right of his neigh-
bor. Within his physical boundaries the dominion of each was
complete. So long as he kept within them and what he did
within them was consistent with an equally absolute dominion of
the neighbor within his boundaries, the law was to keep its hands
off. For the end of law was taken to -be a maximum of self-
assertion by each, limited only by the possibility of a like self-
2 C. J. S., Adjoining Landowners §51; see Note, 133 A. L. R. 691, 701 (1941)
and cases there cited.
" Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 Conn. 387, 40 Am. Rep. 182 (1880). Contra: Parker
v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935) (where competitive motive in erection
ignored as factor in determining liability).5 D'Inzillo v. Basile, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 293 (1943) ; accord: Stroup v. Rauselbach,
217 Mo. App. 236, 261 S. W. 346 (1924).8
.,ee Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N. E. 548 (1904).7 Daniel v. Birmingham Dental Manuf. Co., 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652 (1922).8White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 241 Pac. 367, 43 A. L. R. 23 (1925).
'Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P. 2d 425 (1934); Fisher v. Feige,
137 Cal. 39, 69 Pac. 618 (1902); Honsel v. Conant, 12 Ill. App. 259 (1882);
Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N. E. 548 (1904) ; Triplett v. Jackson, 5 Kan. App.
777, 48 Pac. 931 (1897); Saddler -v. Alexander, 56 S. W. 518, 21 Ky. Law Rep.
518 (1900) ; Lord v. Langdon, 91 Me. 221, 39 Atl. 552 (1898) ; Rideout v. Knox,
148 Mass. 368, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560 (1889) ; Bordeaux v. Greene, 22 Mont. 254,
56 Pac. 218 (1899); Howe v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 150 S. W. 2d 496
(Mo. App. 1941) ; Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765 (1896) ; Karasek
v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 Pac. 33 (1900) ; Koblegard v. Hale, 60 W. Va. 37, 53
S. E. 793 (1906) ; Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N. W. 308 (1900). See
Capifal Airways v. Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 466, 18 N. E.
2d 776, 778 (1939). The United States Supreme Court recognized this line of
cases in Camfield v. United States, 167 'U. S. 518, 523 (1896) as the majority
view, but termed it "unjust."
" Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765 (1896).
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assertion by all. If, therefore, he built a fence eight feet high
cutting off light and air from his neighbor .. . this was consistent
with his neighbor's d6ing the same; it was an exercise of his inci-
dental jus utendi, and the mere circumstance that he did it out of
unmixed malice was quite immaterial since it in no way infringed
the liberty or invaded the property of the neighbor." '"
In this country today the utility element of the common law theory
has disappeared, for the doctrine of ancient lights is not generally ap-
plied . 2  And an easement of light and air cannot be acquired by pre-
scription. This also is the law in Pennsylvania."3
In opposition to the principal case stands the modem trend allowing
redress in the spite fence cases' 4 and the criticism that the common law
doctrine stated above has received in the better decisions.
For many courts have vigorously asserted that motive was of prime
importance in these cases.15 Thus spite structures have been held private
nuisances and abated,'0 or damages have been allowed.' 7 This line of
decisions proceeds on the theory that the right to use one's property pri-
marily for the purpose of injuring others is not a right of ownership,'8
that instead, there must be legal cause or excuse for injury to another to
render it remediless.' 9 The North Carolina court in Barger v. Bar-
ringer,20 a leading case for this view, declares that every person, in the
use of his property, should avoid injury to his neighbor as much as
possible. The reasonableness of an interference with a landowner's use
" PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 196.
124 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1194 n. 74 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939) and cases there
cited. Contra: Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873).
"
3 Beckershoff v. Bomba, 112 Pa. Super. 294, 170 Atl. 449 (1934); Haverstick
v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
"Note, 11 VA. L. Rnv. 122 (1925) for development of trend. See note 15
infra for later cases.
'5 Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912) ; Griffin v. Northridge,
64 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P. 2d 800 (1944); Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491,
13 S. E. 2d 20, 133 A. L. R. 684 (1941); Humphrey v. Mansbach, 265 Ky.,675,
97 S. W. 2d 573 (1936); Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935);
Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838, 8 L. R. A. 184 (1888) ; Dunbar v.
O'Brien, 117 Neb. 245, 220 N. W. 278, 58 A. L. R. 1033 (1928) ; Burris v. Creech,
220 N. C. 302, 17 S. E. 2d 123 (1941); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433,
66 S. E. 439, 25 L.'R. A. (N. s.) 831, 19 Ann. Cas. 472 (1909) ; Horan v. Byrnes,
72 N. H. 93, 54 AUt. 945 (1903); Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 Pac.,
1158, L. R. A. 1916F, 903 (1916); Racich v. Mastrovich, 65 S. D. 321, 273 N. W.
660 (1937). Note, 18 N. C. L. REv. 261 (1940).
" Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912) ; Hornsby v. Smith, 191
Ga. 491, 13 S. E. 2d 20 (1941) ; Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935) ;
Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838 (1888) ; Burris v. Creech, 220 N. C.
302, 17 S. E. 2d 123 (1941); Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93, 54 Atl. 945 (1903).
"Griffin v. Northridge, 64 Cal. App. 2d 69, 153 P. 2d 800 (1944) ; Humphrey
v. Mansbach, 265 Ky. 675, 97 S. W. 2d 573 (1936) ; Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C,
433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909); Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 Pac. 1158
(1916).
"See Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 389, 37 N. W. 838, 842 (1888).
" Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909).
20 Ibid.
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of his land may well depend upon the actor's motive in interfering 2'
Pennsylvania has a statute which declares a fence erected or main-
rained solely with a malicious motive to be a private nuisance.22 Erec-
tion or maintenance of a structure of this nature is further made a
misdemeanor.0 However, the statute is only applicable to suburban
districts of cities of the first class (those with one million of population).
Inasmuch as the opinion of the supreme court, as well as that of the
chancellor in the trial. report, did not mention the existence of the
statute, its operation apparently does not extend to the locus2 4 involved
in the .principal case.
Thirteen other states have enacted statutes prohibiting or giving
some remedy to persons injured by the erection or inaintenance of
spite fences. 25 The Pennsylvania statute is unique in its application to
limited areas within the state. The statutes are construed strictly in
favor of the owner of the structure as they are in derogation of the
common law. 26 The statutes are interpreted to require that malice must
be the dominant motive in the erection.2 7  Their constitutional validity
has been upheld generally under the police power of the various
jurisdictions. 28
"PROSSER, TORTS §5 n. 59 (1941). Compare American Bank and Trust Co. v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 340 (1921) with South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk
Bank, 27 Vt. 505 (1854) and Silliman v. Dober, 165 Minn. 87, 205 N. W. 696
(1925) with St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour and Co., 156 S. C. 397, 153
S. E. 473 (1930).
21 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1946) tit. 53, §4231. It shall be un-
lawful for the owner or occupant of any improved premises, in any suburban dis-
trict of a city or borough (whether the premises concerned be assessed at rural,
suburban, or city rates) to erect any fence, or structure resembling a fence, or to
reerect during the jrocess of repairing, any fence previously erected, upon any
part of the front yard, lawn, or space of said premises, or on or along the boundary
line thereof, of a greater height than four feet, if the height in excess of the said
four feet is unnecessary, or if the same is maliciously erected, elevated, and main-
tained for the purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of the adjoining prem-
ises. Every such fence or structure, so.maliciously erected, elevated and maintained
in excess of four fiet in height, shall be deemed and is hereby declared to be, a
private nuisance.
" PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 53, §4232. Any person or persons erect-
ing and maintaining the fence or structure described in section one hereof (§4231
above) as unlawful and prohibited, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
if convicted thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor
more than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less
than thirty days or not more than six months, or by both fine and imprisonment
to said respective amount and extent, at the discretion of the trial judge.
450-452 Wharton Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
"The statutes are collected and discussed in Note, 25 Ky. L. J. 356 (1937).
One Hundred and Twenty-Two East Fortieth Street Corp. v. Dranyam
Realty Corp., 226 App. Div. 78, 234 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1929).
" Healy v. Spaulding, 104 Me. 122, 71 Adt. 472 (1908) ; Rideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889) ; Hunt v. Coggin, 66 N. H. 140, 20 At. 250 (1889).
" Saperstein v. Berman, 119 Misc. 205, 195 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1922); Rideout
v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889). See Camfield v. United States, 167
U. S. 518, 523 (1896).
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The Pennsylvania statute and the Restatement of Torts,20 as well as
a recent appellate decision pointing the way,3 0 should have enabled the
court to find a basis for a principle more in keeping with the needs of
the community.
G. L. GRANTHAM, JR.
2'4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §829 (1939) ... An intentional invasion of another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable and the actor is liable
when the harm is substantial and his conduct is
(a) inspired solely by hostility and a desire to cause harm to the other; or
Lb) contrary to common standards of decency.
Illustration:
A and B own adjoining residences. A quarrel between them results in hard
feelings, and A builds a fence 25 feet high along the boundary between his lot
and B's lot. A's sole purpose in building this fence was to annoy B by shutting
out the light and view from his windows. A's conduct is malicious and he is
liable to B.
30 Feathers v. Baer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 305 (1944) (where a spite fence was abated
by mandatory* injunction even in absence of application of the Pennsylvania*
statute).
